Internal versus external growth in industries with scale economies: A computational model of optimal merger policy by Mermelstein, Ben et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Mannheim / Department of Economics 
 
Working Paper Series 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Internal versus External Growth in Industries with Scale 
Economies: A Computational Model of Optimal Merger 
Policy 
 
Ben Mermelstein    Volker Nocke 
Mark A. Satterthwaite     Michael D. Whinston 
 
Working Paper 14-10 
 
 
April 2014  
 
Internal versus External Growth in Industries with Scale
Economies: A Computational Model of Optimal Merger
Policy
Ben Mermelstein
Northwestern University
Volker Nocke
University of Mannheim and CEPR
Mark A. Satterthwaite
Northwestern University
Michael D. Whinston
M.I.T. and NBER
April 4, 2014
Abstract
We study optimal merger policy in a dynamic model in which the presence of scale
economies implies that rms can reduce costs through either internal investment in build-
ing capital or through mergers. The model, which we solve computationally, allows rms
to invest or propose mergers according to the relative protability of these strategies. An
antitrust authority is able to block mergers at some cost. We examine the optimal policy
when the antitrust authority can commit to a policy rule and when it cannot commit, and
consider both consumer value and aggregate value as possible objectives of the antitrust
authority. We nd that optimal policy can di¤er substantially from what would be best
considering only welfare in the period the merger is proposed. We also nd that the abil-
ity to commit can lead to a signicant welfare improvement. In general, antitrust policy
can greatly a¤ect rmsoptimal investment behavior, and rmsinvestment behavior can
in turn greatly a¤ect the antitrust authoritys optimal policy.
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1 Introduction
Most analyses of optimal horizontal merger policy are static.1 But many real-world mergers
occur in markets in which dynamic issues are a central feature of competition among rms.
In this paper, we analyze merger policy in the context of a model in which the presence of
economies of scale presents rms with the opportunity to lower their average and marginal
costs through capital accumulation. These scale economies are also the source of merger-
related e¢ ciencies, as a combination of capital lowers average and marginal costs. Thus, in
such settings, an antitrust authoritys merger approval decisions must weigh any extra cost
reductions gained by allowing a merger (compared to insisting on internal growth) against the
deadweight losses arising from increased market power.
As one example, consider the 2011 attempted merger between AT&T and T-Mobile USA.2
The merger would have combined the network infrastructure of the two rms. Proponents of
the merger argued that this combination would greatly improve both rmsservice. Opponents
countered that the merger would increase market power, and that absent the merger the two
rms would each have incentives to independently increase their networks. Thus, the Federal
Communications Commission and Department of Justice faced the question of whether any
e¢ ciency gains from increased infrastructure scale due to the merger (which in this case would
be realized on the demand side through enhanced quality) were su¢ cient to justify the increase
in market power.
We study these issues computationally in a dynamic industry model in which, in each period,
active rms compete and also make investments to increase their capital stock. Economies of
scale in production imply that mergers generate e¢ ciencies. The model is similar to Pakes and
McGuire (1994) and Ericson and Pakes (1995), but with some important di¤erences. Most
signicantly, we modify the investment technology to make it merger neutral, so that mergers
do not change the investment opportunities that are available in the market. Our investment
technology also allows for signicantly richer investment dynamics than do most computational
dynamic models, as rms can increase their capital stocks by multiple units, and new entrants
can choose endogeneously how many units of capital to build when entering.
In addition, we introduce the possibility for rms to merge as well as an antitrust authority
who can block proposed mergers. The decision to propose a merger is endogeneous and deter-
mined through a bargaining process. In general, bargaining over mergers involves externalities
and the theory literature currently has few satisfying general solutions for such settings. For
this reason, the present paper restricts attention to industries in which there are at most two
active rms in any period. Doing so allows us to use the familiar Nash bargaining solution, and
makes clear how the prospect of bargaining over mergers impacts investment incentives. Our
approach to modeling the antitrust authority considers both the case in which the authority
can commit to a policy rule and the case in which commitment is impossible. We refer to the
policy that emerges in the latter case as a Markov perfect policy. While issues of commitment
and Markov perfection in dynamic environments have been a focus of the macro and political
economy literatures for some time [see, e.g., Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon
(1983), and Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996)], they have received scant attention in the antitrust
1For example, see the classic papers by Williamson (1968) and Farrell and Shapiro (1990).
2See Pittman and Li (2013) and DeGraba and Rossten (2014), and the references therein.
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literature.3 Within this framework, we consider both maximization of consumer surplus and
of aggregate surplus as possible objectives of the authority.
We begin in Section 2 by describing our model. Section 3 formally denes a Markov perfect
equilibrium and discusses how we construct these equilibria computationally.
Section 4 analyzes rm behavior under two extreme antitrust policies: one in which no
mergers are allowed, and the other in which all are. We examine rmsinvestment behavior
and merger decisions in three di¤erent markets: a large one, an intermediate one, and a small
one. We rst describe rm behavior and industry dynamics for these three markets when no
mergers are allowed. In the large market steady state, the industry spends most of its time
in states with relatively symmetric capital levels for the rms, although should the industry
through chance depreciation end up at a highly asymmetric position, it stays there for a long
time. In contrast, the small market steady state is highly asymmetric, with one rm often
dominating the industry. The intermediate market no-mergers equilibrium lies between these
two.
We then begin to explore the impact of merger policy by studying the Markov perfect equi-
libria when instead all mergers are allowed. We nd a number of striking features. Not sur-
prisingly, the steady state when all mergers are allowed involves a monopoly or near-monopoly
market structure much more often than when mergers are prohibited. It also involves a lower
average level of capital. This arises because total investment is lower in monopoly and near-
monopoly states. Investment behavior also changes when mergers are allowed. Particularly
striking is signicantly greater investment by small rms in states in which one rm is very
dominant, a form of entry for buyout [Rasmusen (1988)]. The steady state discounted ex-
pected value of consumer surplus, aggregate surplus, and incumbent rm prots all decline
when all mergers are allowed, while the discounted expected value of total industry prot (in-
cluding entrants) is essentially unchanged. The surprising reduction in incumbent prot is
driven by the behavior, just noted, of new entrants after a merger. This investment is done at
high investment costs and dissipates a great deal of industry prot.
In Section 5 we examine optimal merger policy, considering as objectives both discounted
expected consumer surplus (consumer value) and discounted expected aggregate surplus
(aggregate value). We begin by looking at the static benchmark, examining which mergers
would be approved from a myopic static perspective, considering only the e¤ect on welfare
in the period the merger is proposed. From that perspective, very few mergers are consumer
surplus-enhancing, while many mergers increase aggregate surplus.
We then identify both the Markov perfect policy (the no-commitment policy outcome) and
the optimal commitment policy under both objectives. With a consumer value objective, the
Markov perfect policy and the commitment policy are almost identical and basically allow no
mergers, just as with the static consumer surplus criterion.
With an aggregate value objective, however, the no-commitment and commitment policies
each allow many fewer mergers than the optimal static policy. The reason is that, as seen in
Section 4, allowing mergers leads to ine¢ cient entry-for-buyout behavior, which makes merg-
ers much less attractive socially, whether or not commitment is possible. Commitment can
3We briey discuss below the small literature on antitrust policy that has addressed such issues. Issues of
commitment have been considered in the literature on optimal regulation; see, for example, La¤ont and Tirole
(1993).
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lead to a signicant gain in aggregate value. Moreover, we nd that endowing the antitrust
authority with a consumer value objective achieves a substantial gain in aggregate value when
the antitrust authority cannot commit to its approval policy. This nding is consistent with
the suggestion of Lyons (2002), but for a di¤erent reason: in Lyons (2002) this gets the rms
to propose more attractive mergers, while here it induces much better investment behavior.
Overall, we nd that optimal merger policy  whether with commitment or without commit-
ment  is signicantly a¤ected by rmsinvestment behavior, and rmsinvestment behavior
is in turn signicantly a¤ected by merger policy.
Finally, in Section 6 we explore several extensions/robustness checks. First, we compare
optimal merger policy to the optimal policy for a planner who can control investment and
merger behavior but not output competition. Because this planner can control investment
behavior, he is much more inclined to merge the rms to achieve short-run scale economies.
Second, we study the e¤ect of parameter changes that improve the investment e¢ ciency of small
vs. large rms. While entry-for-buyout behavior persists, this change reduces the social costs of
entrantspre-merger capital investments. Third, we examine how the likelihood/speed of entry
following a merger a¤ects optimal policy. We nd that while quicker entry raises consumer
and aggregate surplus, under an aggregate value criterion it makes the Markov perfect policy
less accepting of mergers as it exacerbates the entry-for-buyout problem. Fourth, we explore
whether our model may have multiple equilibria. We nd little evidence of multiplicity.
Section 7 concludes.
The paper is related to several strands of literature. The rst is theoretical work on dy-
namic merger policy. Most of this work examines models in which two mergers between two
non-overlapping pairs of rms can take place sequentially in static models of competition [e.g.,
Nilssen and Sorgard (1998), Motta and Vasconcelos (2005), and Matushima (2001)]. An ex-
ception is Nocke and Whinston (2010). They study a many-period dynamic model in which
mergers become feasible stochastically through time and establish conditions under which the
optimal dynamic (commitment) policy of an antitrust authority who maximizes consumer value
is the fully myopic policy that approves a merger if and only if it would raise consumer sur-
plus in the period it is proposed. The model in this paper departs from Nocke and Whinston
(2010) in a number of ways, most notably in introducing investment by rms and in locat-
ing the e¢ ciency gains from merger in the achievement of scale economies through capital
acquisition.4
A second related strand of literature examines dynamic models of industry equilibrium with
investment, most notably Pakes and McGuire (1994) and Ericson and Pakes (1995). Some of
this literature has examined the e¤ects of one-time mergers on industry evolution [e.g., Berry
and Pakes (1993), Cheong and Judd (2000), Benkard, Bodoh-Creed, and Lazarez (2010)]. Clos-
est to our work are Gowrisankaran (1997) and (1999). Gowrisankaran (1999) introduces an
endogeneous merger bargaining game into the Pakes-McGuire model and examines industry
evolution when rms can choose whether, when, and with whom to merge. Our model di¤ers
in a number of respects: First, as mentioned above, we modify the Pakes-McGuire/Ericson-
Pakes investment technology to make it merger neutral, and give entrants the same technology
as incumbents with zero capital. Second, we locate the e¢ ciency e¤ects of mergers in scale
4The model here also di¤ers from Nocke and Whinston (2010) in that rms that do not merge in a given
period may consummate a merger with di¤erent e¢ ciencies (i.e., with di¤erent capital levels) in future periods.
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economies achieved through capital acquisition, rather than in randomly drawn synergy gains.
Third, we focus on settings with just two active rms and use the Nash bargaining solution
over mergers. While restrictive, we do this because it allows us to examine a case in which the
bargaining model is well accepted and easily understood. In unpublished work, Gowrisankaran
(1997) introduces antitrust policy into the Gowrisankaran (1999) model. Specically, he exam-
ines the e¤ect of commitments to Herndahl-based policies that block mergers if they result
in a Herndahl index above some maximum threshold and nds little e¤ect of varying the
threshold on welfare. We di¤er in considering a broader range of possible policy commitments
and in examining the equilibrium policy when the antitrust authority cannot commit. We
also nd quite di¤erent results, with policy having signicant e¤ects. In both papers, optimal
policy di¤ers substantially from what would be myopically (i.e., statically) optimal.
2 The Model
We study a dynamic industry model in which rms may invest in capacity, or alternatively
merge, to increase their capital stocks and harness scale economies. The model follows in broad
outline Pakes and McGuire (1994) and Ericson and Pakes (1995), but with some important
di¤erences in its investment technology, as well as in the introduction of mergers and merger
policy.
2.1 Static demand, costs, and competition
In each period, active rms produce a homogeneous good in a market in which demand is
Q(p) = B(A p). The production technology, which requires capital and labor, is described by
the production function F (K;L) = KL(1 ), where the capital share parameter is  2 (0; 1)
and the scale economy parameter is  > 1. Normalizing the price of labor to be 1, for a xed
level of capital K, this production function gives rise to the short-run cost function
C(QjK) = Q
1=(1 )
K=(1 )
with marginal cost
CQ(QjK) =

1
(1  )

Q[1=(1 )] 1
K=(1 )
:
With this technology, a merger that combines the capital of two identical rms reduces
both average and marginal cost if their joint output remains unchanged. This e¤ect will be
the source of merger-related e¢ ciencies in our model. Letting R measure the extent of this
cost reduction, we have
R  CQ(2Qj2K)
CQ(QjK) =
C(2Qj2K)=Q
C(QjK)=Q = 2
( 11  )(
1 
 ):
Note in particular that the marginal cost reduction depends on the scale economy parameter
 and capital share , but is independent of the output level (and hence demand). In our
computations we will focus on a case in which  = 1=3 and  = 1:1. Given these values, R is
0.91.
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In each period, active rms engage in Cournot competition given their capital stocks (a
rm with no capital produces nothing), resulting in prot (Ki;K i) for a rm with capital
stock Ki when its rival has capital stock K i.5 The resulting consumer surplus is denoted
CS(K1;K2).
2.2 Investment and Depreciation
In Pakes and McGuire (1994) and Ericson and Pakes (1995) a rm chooses in each period how
much money to invest, with the probability of successfully adding one unit of capital increasing
in the investment level. We depart from this technology because in a model of mergers it would
impose a signicant ine¢ ciency to mergers, as each merger between two rms would remove
an investment possibility from the market.6 Instead, we specify an investment technology
that is merger neutral at a market level. By that we mean that a planner who controlled the
rms and wanted to achieve at least cost any xed increase in the markets aggregate capital
stock would be indi¤erent about whether the rms merge. With this assumption we isolate
the market-level e¢ ciency e¤ects of mergers fully in the scale economies of the production
function.7 Specically, we imagine that there are two ways that a rm can invest.
The rst is capital augmentation: each unit j of capital that a rm owns can be doubled
at some cost cj 2 [c; c] drawn from a distribution F . The draws for di¤erent units of capital
are independent and identically distributed. Thus, for a rm that has NK units of capital,
there are NK cost draws. Given these draws, if the rm decides to augment m  NK units
of capital it will do so for the capital units with the cheapest cost draws. Note that capital
augmentation is completely merger neutral: when two rms merge, their collective investment
possibilities do not change.
The second is greeneld investment : a rm can build as many capital units as it wants
at a cost cg 2 [c; cg] drawn from a distribution G. Greeneld investment allows a rm whose
capital stock is zero to invest, albeit at a cost that exceeds that of capital augmentation. We
also choose the range of greeneld costs [c; cg] to be small so that this investent technology is
approximately merger neutral. (It would be fully merger neutral if cg = c; in our computations
we introduce uncertain greeneld investment costs to ensure existence of equilibrium.)
Note that with our assumptions investment opportunities will be merger neutral at the
market level, but not at the rm level larger rms do have (stochastically) lower investment
costs.
As we discuss shortly, our model allows for entry. In contrast to Pakes and McGuire (1994)
and Ericson and Pakes (1995), we endow an entrant with the same investment technology as
incumbents. The entrant, however, starts with no capital, so it must initially do greeneld
investment.
Put together, the capital augmentation and greeneld investment processes allow for sig-
nicantly richer investment dynamics than in the typical dynamic industry model. Firms can
5A rms short-run cost is strictly convex if (1 ) < 1, in which case there is a unique Cournot equilibrium
if the demand function is weakly concave. In our analysis, these conditions are satised.
6Alternatively, if the merged rm kept both investment processes we would need to keep track, as a separate
state variable, of how many investment processes a rm possesses, which has no natural bound.
7Of course, because of noncooperative investment behavior, there could be e¢ ciency benets of the merger
in actually achieving a given amount of market-wide capital growth at least cost.
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expand their capital by multiple units at a time through either investment method. And rms
with no capital, including new entrants, can decide endogenously how far to jump up in their
capital stock.
Capital also depreciates: in each period a unit of capital has a probability d > 0 of becom-
ing worthless (including for any future capital augmentation). Depreciation realizations are
independent across units of capital. This depreciation process is also merger neutral. Finally,
the rms discount the future according to discount factor  < 1.
A state is a capital stock pair (K1;K2). In our computations rms will be restricted to an
integer number of possible capital levels, with the maximal capital level S chosen to be non-
binding. Since a rm may have zero capital, we dene S f0; 1; 2; : : : ; Sg to be the admissible
values of Ki and S2 = S  S to be the state space.
2.3 Mergers and Bargaining
In each period, rms can propose a merger that will combine their capital. Following a merger,
a new entrant appears in the market with zero capital.8
Proposing a merger involves a cost  2 [; ] drawn each period in an iid fashion from
distribution . Firms engage in Nash bargaining to decide whether to merge. Thus, they
propose a merger provided the expected gain in their joint continuation value, taking into
account the likelihood the merger will be approved, exceeds . If they merge, they make a
side transfer to split evenly the joint value gain from the merger. In the event the antitrust
authority rejects the proposed merger, they split the proposal cost evenly. The disagreement
values in this bargaining are the two rmscontinuation values in the event they do not merge
this period. Let V (K1;K2) denote the interim expected net present value (ENPV) of a rm
with K1 units of capital when its rival has K2 units of capital. This interim value is measured
just prior to the output competition stage. (In the timing given below, this is at the start of
stage 5.) If the capital stocks prior to the merger stage are (K1;K2), then the joint value gain
from merging (gross of any proposal cost) is
G(K1;K2)  fV (K1 +K2; 0)  [V (K1;K2) + V (K2;K1)]g; (1)
where the rst term is the joint (interim) value in case the merger takes place and the second
term is the sum of the disagreement payo¤s(i.e., the sum of the interim values if no merger
occurs).
2.4 Merger Policy
The antitrust authority has the ability to block mergers. Blocking a proposed merger involves
a cost b 2 [b; b] drawn each period in an iid fashion from a distribution H. We consider
two possible scenarios. In one, we suppose that the antitrust authority can commit to a
deterministic policy a() : S2 ! f0; 1g that species whether a proposed merger would be
8Note that entry is allowed only once a merger has occurred, but not before. The reason is that we cannot
evaluate the protability of entry for a third rm without having a solution for the multi-rm bargaining with
externalities problem that would arise after its entry. We have also analyzed the case in which only the two
manager-owners possess the knowledge of how to operate a rm in this industry, and the new entrant is one of
these owners. We get similar results (see the Appendix).
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approved (a = 1) or not (a = 0) in each state (K1;K2).9 These commitment policies will
be restricted further to two classes of policies described in Section 5. Under the commitment
scenario the two rms never propose a merger that will be rejected because they will incur the
proposal cost. Consequently, with commitment the antitrust authority never incurs a blocking
cost.
We also consider cases in which the antitrust authority cannot commit to its policy. In that
case, in any state (K1;K2) it will decide whether to block a merger by comparing the increase
in its welfare criterion from blocking (we will consider both consumer value and aggregate
value) to its blocking cost realization b. In that case, a Markovian strategy for the antitrust
authority is a state contingent and history independent threshold bb(K1;K2) describing the
highest blocking cost at which the authority will block a merger in a given state (K1;K2).
Equivalently, this can be translated into a merger acceptance probability a(K1;K2) 2 [0; 1].
As we previously noted, we call the equilibrium policy that emerges a Markov perfect policy.
Identifying this policy is of interest for both positive and normative reasons. First, on a
positive level, the antitrust authority may well lack an ability to commit to its future approval
policy. For example, while both the Department of Justive and Federal Trade Commission in
the U.S. periodically issue Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which may partially commit these
agencies, over time their actual policy often comes to deviate substantially from the Guidelines
prescriptions. On a normative level, the possibility of gains from commitment may provide a
justication for legislatively endowing the antitust authority with an objective function di¤erent
from the true social goal. In particular, specifying that the antitrust authority seek to maximize
consumer value rather than aggregate value in deciding whether to approve a merger may result
in greater expected aggregate value.
2.5 Timing
In each period, the timing of the model is as follows:
1. Firms observe each otherscapital stocks.
2. Firms observe their proposal cost  and bargain over whether to propose a merger.
3. If a merger is proposed, the antitrust agency observes its blocking cost b and decides
whether to block it. (This is when commitment is not possible; the antitrust authority
simply follows its commitment strategy when commitment is possible.) If a merger is
consummated in state (K1;K2), the merged rms capital stock is K1 +K2.
4. If a merger occurred, an entrant enters with no capital.
5. Firms choose their output levels simultaneously and the market price is determined.
Firms with no capital, such as entrants, cannot produce.
6. Firms privately observe their capital augmentation and greeneld cost draws and decide
on their investments.
9Note that we restrict attention to history-independent policies. If this were not the case, rms would not
generally employ Markovian policies.
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7. Stochastic depreciation occurs, resulting in the capital levels at which rms begin the
next period.
3 Equilibrium and Computation
In this section, we dene equilibrium policies and values more formally and discuss our com-
putational algorithm.
3.1 Firm Policies
Fix the symmetric merger policy a (). We focus on Markov perfect equilibria in which the rms
merger and investment policies are symmetric with respect to the industry state (K1;K2). We
refer to the industrys state at the beginning of the period, just prior to stage 1, as its ex
ante state and we refer to its state just after stage 4s entry activity concludes and before
stage 5s production as its interim state. Firm is ex ante value V (Ki;K i) is its ENPV at the
beginning of the period and its interim value V (Ki;K i) as dened in the previous section
is its ENPV before stage 5s production decisions. Thus, if the ex ante state is (K1;K2) and
no merger occurs, then the rmsinterim values are V (K1;K2) and V (K2;K1). But if they
do merge, then the industry transits to either interim state (K1 + K2; 0) or interim state
(0;K1 + K2), each with probability 1=2. This transition rule ensures that the steady state
distribution over states is indeed symmetric. The interim value of the rm that the merger
created is V (K1 +K2; 0) and the entrants interim value is V (0;K1 +K2). Note that for
notational simplicity we suppress the dependence of rmsvalues and behavior on the policy
a ().
Each period the rms make two decisions that a¤ect the state to which the industry transits.
After learning the proposal cost ; the rms jointly decide whether to propose a merger. Then
each rm, after privately learning the Ki independent draws of its capital augmentation costs
fcjgKij=1 and the single independent draw of its greeneld cost cg, independently decides how
many units of capital (if any) to add.10
Merger proposals. As outlined in the previous section, rms 1 and 2 propose a merger if
and only if doing so increases their joint interim value net of the proposal cost. That is, if the
antitrust authoritys approval probability is a(K1;K2), the rms propose a merger in ex ante
state (K1;K2) if and only if the realized proposal cost  satises:
 < a(K1;K2)G(K1;K2)
where G(K1;K2) is the joint gain from merger (gross of the proposal cost) dened in equation
(1). This implies that the ex ante probability of a merger proposal in state (K1;K2) is
 (K1;K2)  (a(K1;K2)G(K1;K2)) (2)
and the ex ante probability of a merger occurring is a(K1;K2) (K1;K2). Nash bargaining
over the gains from merging implies that rm is ex ante value is
V (Ki;K i) = V (Ki;K i) +  (K1;K2)
1
2
fa(K1;K2)G(K1;K2)  E [jK1;K2]g (3)
10Each rm also decides on the quantity it produces. This decision is embedded in the rmssingle-period
prot function  (K1;K2) :
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where V (Ki;K i) is the rms disagreement value, the term in curly brackets is the merging
rmsexpected net gain from carrying out the merger (which they divide equally), and
E [jK1;K2] 
R a(K1;K2)G(K1;K2)

d()
 (K1;K2)
is the expected proposal cost conditional on the merger being proposed.
Investment. We now turn to rmsinvestment decisions. Let rm is investment policy
function at the interim stage be i(jKi;K i) : f0; 1;    ; S   Kig  S2 ! [0; 1]. Prior to
the realization of its cost draws, i gives the probability i(kjKi;K i) of rm i adding k 2
f0; 1; :::; S   Kig units of capital. Recall that at the end of each period each unit of capital
depreciates with probability d, so if rm i enters the depreciation stage with Ki units of capital,
then the probability it exits the stage with K 0i units of capital is
(K 0ijKi) =
(  
Ki
K0i

(1  d)K0idKi K0i if K 0i 2 f0; 1; :::;Kig ,
0 otherwise.
(4)
Given that rm i follows investment policy i in state (Ki;K i); the probability of rm i
leaving the period with K 0i 2 S units of capital is given by the transition function
 i(K
0
ijKi;K i; i) =
S KiX
m=0
i(mjKi;K i)(K 0ijKi +m): (5)
Prior to making its investment decision, rm i privately observes Ki draws of the capital
augmentation cost cj 2 [c; c] and one draw of its greeneld cost cg 2 [c; cg]. For a given
realization ~c of its (Ki + 1)-length vector of cost draws, let cKi(j~c) denote the resulting cost
function where cKi(kj~c) is the minimum cost for rm i to add k units of capital. Let CKibe the
set of possible cost draws ~c and let hKi be the associated density that the distributions F and
G of the cost draws determine. For a given draw ~c; cost function cKi(j~c), rivals investment
policy  i, and ex ante value function V (), rm i chooses ki so as to maximize its expected
continuation value minus the investment cost:
max
ki2f0;1;:::;S Kig
 cKi(kij~c) + 
X
K0i2S
X
K0 i2S
(K 0ijKi + ki) i(K 0 ijK i;Ki;  i)V (K 0i;K 0 i):
Let ki denote the solution to this optimization problem (which, generically, is unique), and
dene !(ki; ~c;Ki;K ij i) to be the indicator function with value 1 if ki = ki and 0 otherwise.
Firm is investment policy therefore is
i(kijKi;K i) =
Z
CKi
!(ki; ~c;Ki;K ij i)hKi(~c)d~c; (6)
for ki 2 f0; 1; :::; S   Kig: This gives rise to the rms expected investment cost in state
(Ki;K i):
Ec(Ki;K ij i) =
Z
CKi
X
ki2f0;1;:::;S Kig
!(ki; ~c;Ki;K ij i)cKi(kij~c)hKi(~c)d~c: (7)
9
Given symmetric investment policies and transition functions i =  i   and  i =  i   ,
we may write the rms interim value in state (K1;K2) as its prots less its investment costs
incurred plus its expected discounted ex ante value in the continuation game:
V (Ki;K i) = (Ki;K i)  Ec(Ki;K ij)
+
X
K00i 2S
X
K00 i2S
(K 00i jKi;K i; )(K 00 ijK i;Ki; )V (K 00i ;K 00 i): (8)
Equation (3) gives a formula for V (Ki;K i) in terms of V (Ki;K i) and G (Ki;K i) ; where
G (Ki;K i) itself is a function of interim values. Consequently equation (3) together with
the formula (8) for V (Ki;K i) implicitly dene the Bellman equation for the ex ante value
V (Ki;K i).
In summary, given the xed merger policy a (), if for all states (K1;K2) 2 S2 the merger
proposal probability  (Ki;K i); the rmsinvestment policy (kijKi;K i), each rms ex ante
value V (Ki;K i) ; and each rms interim value V (Ki;K i) satisfy equations (2), (3), (6),
and (8), then

 ; ; V; V
	
is a Markov perfect equilibrium that policy a () induces.
Transition array and steady state. Given symmetric merger policy a (), investment
policy , and transition function  , the transition array that the induced equilibrium generates
is
T [(K1;K2) ; (K
0
1;K
0
2)] = (1  a(K1;K2) (K1;K2)) [(K 01jK1;K2; )(K 02jK2;K1; )]
+
1
2
a(K1;K2) (K1;K2)f(K 01j0;K1 +K2; )(K 02jK1 +K2; 0; )
+(K 01jK1 +K2; 0; )(K 02j0;K1 +K2; )g:
where (K1;K2) is the beginning-of-period state and (K 01;K
0
2) is the state at the beginning of
the next period.
To calculate welfare measures and statistics of the industrys dynamics we need the long
run, steady state distribution that results from implementation of merger policy a (). Let

 : S2 ! f1; 2; : : : ; (S+ 1)2g be an invertible mapping that maps the two-dimensional array of
states (K1;K2) into a row vector. Then, for every ! 2 
 (K1;K2) and !0 2 
 (K 01;K 02), dene
the (S + 1)  (S + 1) transition matrix T^ to have element T^ (!; !0) = T 
 1 (!) ;
 1 (!0)
at row ! (the beginning-of-period state) and column !0 (the state at the beginning of the
next period). Let P^ be a length (S + 1)2 row vector. If P^ T^ = P^ ; then P^ is a steady state
distribution across states that the policy a () induces. If P^ is unique, then, for any probability
vector P;
P^ = lim
t!1P T^ T^ T^    T^| {z }
t times
;
i.e., no matter what the initial probability distribution P over states is, the industry converges
to the steady-state distribution P^ .11 A simpler representation of the steady state probabilities
is the (S + 1)  (S + 1) matrix P whose entry in row K1 and column K2 is the steady state
probability of state (K1;K2):
P (K1;K2)  P^ [
 (K1;K2)] :
11 In our model we cannot guarantee that, for some positive integer t; every element of T^ t is positive, i.e.,
we cannot guarantee that T^ is a regular Markov transition matrix. If it were regular, then P^ would be unique.
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3.2 Welfare and Antitrust Policy
As discussed earlier, we consider two alternative objective functions for the antitrust authority:
CV maximization and AV maximization. We also distinguish between settings in which the
authority can commit to its future policy and those in which it cannot. In this subsection
we rst derive expressions for CV and AV given a xed merger policy a () and the rms
Markov perfect strategies. We then make the policy a () variable and dene the antitrust
authoritys optimal commitment policy and its optimal no-commitment (i.e., Markov perfect)
policy. Throughout the discussion, whether a () is xed or variable,  ; ; V; V 	 is the Markov
perfect equilibrium that a () induces the rms to follow.
Consumer surplus, producer surplus, and aggregate surplus. Recall that CS (K1;K2)
is the consumer surplus that Cournot competition between the two rms generates given their
capital levels K1 and K2 at the time of production in stage 5. If the ex ante state is (K1;K2)
and no merger occurs, then the consumer surplus realized is CS (K1;K2). If a merger occurs
in the period, then the consumer surplus realized is CS (K1 +K2; 0). The expected consumer
surplus at the ex ante state (K1;K2) is therefore
ECS(K1;K2) = [1  a(K1;K2) (K1;K2)]CS (K1;K2)+a(K1;K2) (K1;K2)CS (K1 +K2; 0)
where a(K1;K2) (K1;K2) is the probability a merger occurs. Similarly, expected producer
surplus at ex ante state (K1;K2) is
EPS(K1;K2) = [1  a(K1;K2) (K1;K2)]PS (K1;K2)+a(K1;K2) (K1;K2)PS (K1 +K2; 0) ;
where PS (K1;K2)  (K1;K2) + (K2;K1). Aggregate surplus is the sum of consumer
surplus and producer surplus: AS (K1;K2) = CS (K1;K2) + PS (K1;K2) where (K1;K2)
is the interim state. Consequently, in ex ante state (K1;K2) ; expected aggregate surplus is
EAS (K1;K2) = ECS (K1;K2) + EPS (K1;K2).
Consumer value and aggregate value. We generalize these static criteria to their
dynamic analogues, CV and AV , where the latter accounts not only for incumbentsprots at
the output stage, but also investment costs, merger proposal costs, blocking costs, and future
prots of new entrants. Ex ante consumer value, CV (K1;K2) ; is the ENPV of current and
future expected consumer surplus. Its Bellman equation is
CV (K1;K2) = ECS(K1;K2) + 
X
K012S
X
K022S
T [(K1;K2) ; (K
0
1;K
0
2)]CV (K
0
1;K
0
2) (9)
for all (K1;K2) 2 S2. Interim consumer value is, for all states (K1;K2) ;
CV (K1;K2) = CS (K1;K2) + 
X
K012S
X
K022S
(K 01jK1;K2; 1)(K 02jK1;K2; 2)CV (K 01;K 02):
(10)
Ex ante aggregate value AV (K1;K2) has four components: consumer value CV (K1;K2) ;
the sum of the incumbent rmsex ante values V (K1;K2)+V (K2;K1) ; the ENPV of all future
entrantscash ows EEV (K1;K2), and the ENPV of the antitrust authoritys blocking costs
EBC (K1;K2). Note that sum, V (K1;K2) + V (K2;K1) ; fully accounts for the incumbents
expected merger proposal costs and expected capital investment costs. But neither ECS nor
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V (K1;K2)+V (K2;K1) includes the latter two components, EEV (K1;K2) and EBC (K1;K2) ;
yet the authority should account for them.
Consider EEV (K1;K2). A new rm comes into existence in stage 4 of a period in which a
merger occurs. This new rms interim value is V (0;K1 + K2) where K + K2 is the merged
rms capital level. If the ex ante state is (K1;K2), then the Bellman equation of the ex ante
ENPV of all future entrantscash ows is
EEV (K1;K2) = a(K1;K2) (K1;K2)V (0;K1 +K2)+
X
K012S
X
K022S
T [(K1;K2) ; (K
0
1;K
0
2)] EEV (K 01;K 02):
In interim state (K1;K2) the value is
EEV (K1;K2) = 
X
K012S
X
K022S
T [(K1;K2) ; (K
0
1;K
0
2)] EEV (K 01;K 02):
In Section 2.3 we sketched two scenarios for the antitrust authority. In the rst, the
authority commits to the policy a () with the restriction that a (K1;K2) 2 f0; 1g for all
(K1;K2). Given commitment, the rms know expending resources proposing a merger when
a (K1;K2) = 0 is hopeless because the authority will block the proposal with probability 1.
Consequently the authority never has to block a proposal and incurs zero blocking costs. In
the second scenario the authority does not commit and, in each ex ante state (K1;K2) ; sets a
threshold bb (K1;K2) 2 [b; b] such that it blocks a proposed merger if and only if its private and
random blocking cost b is less than bb. From the rmsviewpoint bb (K1;K2) generates the ex
ante approval probability: a (K1;K2) = 1 H
hbb (K1;K2)i where H is the distribution function
of b.12 Conditional on a merger being proposed, the expected blocking cost in state (K1;K2)
is
E [bjK1;K2] =
Z H 1(1 a(K1;K2))
b
b dH(b):
The Bellman equation for the ex ante ENPV of blocking costs in ex ante state (K1;K2) is
therefore
EBC(K1;K2) =  (K1;K2)E [bjK1;K2] + 
X
K012S
X
K022S
T [(K1;K2) ; (K
0
1;K
0
2)] EBC(K 01;K 02):
In interim state (K1;K2) its value is
EBC(K1;K2) = 
X
K012S
X
K022S
(K 01jK1;K2; 1)(K 02jK1;K2; 2)EBC(K 01;K 02):
Given these denitions, ex ante aggregate value in state (K1;K2) is
AV (K1;K2) = CV (K1;K2)+V (K1;K2)+V (K2;K1)+EEV (K1;K2) EBC(K1;K2) (11)
and interim aggregate value is
AV (K1;K2) = CV (K1;K2)+V (K1;K2)+V (K2;K1)+EEV (K1;K2) EBC(K1;K2): (12)
Optimal commitment policy. The antitrust authority commits to a pure action a(K1;K2) 2
f0; 1g for each state (K1;K2) so as to either (i) maximize the welfare criterions steady state
12Hence a () = 0 corresponds to b and a () = 1 corresponds to b:
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average value or (ii) maximize the welfare criterions value at state (0; 0) where the latter goal
represents a measure of a new industrys welfare contribution. Given a merger policy a () ;
the two rms play their Markov perfect equilibrium

 ; ; V; V
	
. Let the authoritys ex ante
welfare criterion whether consumer value or aggregate value be denoted by W (K1;K2) and
its interim welfare criterion by W (K1;K2). The industrys steady state distribution is the
matrix P whose elements are P (K1;K2). The steady state average value it achieves under
policy a () is
WSS =
X
K012S
X
K022S
P (K 01;K
0
2)W (K
0
1;K
0
2) :
Recalling that the industrys behavior (including the value of WSS) implicitly depends on
a (), if A is the class of admissible commitment policies, then the optimal commitment policy
a () that maximizes steady state welfare is
a () = arg max
a() 2 A
WSS:
Maximizing welfare of a new industry, the antitrust authority chooses a() to maximizeW (0; 0).
Markov perfect policy. The antitrust authority acts as a third player who, unable to
commit, makes its approval decision in every state (K1;K2) so as to maximize its welfare crite-
rion, given the rmsMarkov perfect equilibrium play in the continuation game. The resulting
policy a () and the rmsequilibrium actions together determine the welfare criterions ex ante
and interim values, W (K1;K2) and W (K1;K2).
A given merger policy a () is a Markov perfect merger policy if it satises the one-step de-
viation principle when the two rms play the industry Markov perfect equilibrium

 ; ; V; V
	
that policy a () induces. To check that a () does satisfy the principle, calculate the welfare
gain (gross of the blocking cost) from approving a proposed merger at beginning-of-period state
(K1;K2):
W (K1;K2) W (K1 +K2; 0) W (K1;K2):
Conditional on a merger being proposed at state (K1;K2), the authority approves the proposal
if and only if the realization b 2 b; b of its blocking cost satises
b  bb(K1;K2)   W (K1;K2);
i.e., it approves the merger if and only if blocking increases the welfare criterion net of the
realized cost b. Therefore, before the blocking cost is observed, the probability the authority
approves the merger is 1   H(bb(K1;K2)) = 1   H( W (K1;K2)). This means that for the
policy a () not to violate the one-stage deviation principle and be optimal, it must solve the
equation
a (K1;K2) = 1 H(( W (K1;K2)): (13)
for all (K1;K2) 2 S2.
To summarize, a no-commitment Markov perfect merger policy involve policy and value
functions

 ; ; V; V ;W;W;a
	
that, for all (K1;K2) 2 S2, satisfy:
1. equations (2), (3), (6), (8), (9), (10), and (13) if the welfare criterion is consumer value,
and
2. equations (2), (3), (6), (8), (11), (12), and (13) if the welfare criterion is aggregate value.
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3.3 Computation
The algorithm that we use numerically to solve for equilibria is a version of the well-known
Pakes-McGuire (1994) algorithm. It is a straightforward iterative process. For a given merger
policy a () the procedure works as follows. Pick an initial guess for the investment function (0)
and the interim value function V
(0)
and then compute an initial value of the merger proposal
function  (0) using (2) and of the ex ante value function V (0) using equation (3). Plugging
V (0) and (0) into the right-hand-side of (6), we then compute an updated estimate (1) of
the investment policy function. As this is a di¢ cult integral to evaluate, we use Monte Carlo
integration at each interim state (K1;K2). Specically, for a given vector ~c of random cost
draws, the ex ante value function V (0), and the rivals investment policy function (0) [which
determines the rivals transition probabilities via equation (5)], we calculate rm is optimal
investment decision ki for that instance of ~c. Repeating this over and over with 5000 or more
cost draws we use the proportion of cost draws for which ki is optimal as our estimate of
(1)
 
kijK1;K2; V (0)

. Inserting (1) into (8) yields an updated estimate V
(1)
of the interim
value function. We continue with this iterative procedure until
V (`+1)   V (`)  " for some
small " > 0. The Appendix describes this algorithm in detail and includes a copy of the
MatLab code.
4 Investment and Merger Incentives under Fixed Merger
Policies
In this section we have three goals. First, we describe the specic parameterization of the
model that we employ and discuss the properties of the static monopoly and Cournot equi-
libria that this parameterization implies. Second, we consider the Markov perfect equilibrium
when mergers are prohibited the no-mergerscase. Third, we consider the Markov perfect
equilibrium when rms are permitted to merge in any state in which it is protable for them
to do so the all-mergers-allowedcase. For each policy, we report its long-run steady state
distribution over the state space S2, the producer and consumer values it generates, and the
investment incentives it creates. The all-mergers-allowed equilibrium is very di¤erent than
the no-mergers equilibrium in structure, incentives, and welfare measures. Merging causes the
industry to be much more concentrated than in the no-merger case. Not surprisingly, expected
consumer value is on average substantially reduced. But, surprisingly, expected incumbent
value is also reduced, though not by nearly the same amount, and expected producer value
(which includes the value of future entrants) is essentially unchanged. The key factor behind
this result is the e¤ect of merger policy on rmsinvestment behaviors.
4.1 Three Markets
In our main analysis, we examine three markets that are identical except for the level of market
demand. The market demand takes the form Q (p) = B(3   p) with B = 30 for the large
market, B = 26 for the intermediatemarket, and B = 22 for the smallmarket. We will see
that the small market is a natural monopoly, the large market is a workable duopoly, and the
intermediate market is between those two. Firmsproduction function takes the Cobb-Douglas
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form Q =
 
KL(1 )

with capital share parameter  = 1=3 and scale parameter  = 1:1.
Thus, as noted earlier, a merger between two equal-sized rms who do not alter their output
levels lowers marginal and average costs by 9 percent. The wage rate is normalized to 1.
Table 1 gives a sense of the intermediate markets fundamental static properties with its
strong economies of scale and linear demand. It shows the static Cournot equilibrium outcomes
for three di¤erent states: (1; 0); (10; 0); and (5; 5): The rst two states are monopoly states
since the second rm has zero units of capital, while the third is a symmetric duopoly state.
The comparison between the two monopoly states shows the substantial e¤ects of the scale
economies on marginal cost. It also shows for state (1; 0) the e¤ect of linear demand when
price is high and quantity small: demand is quite elastic causing a small price-cost markup.
Table 1: Intermediate Market Static Equilibrium
State (1; 0) (10; 0) (5; 5)
Marginal Cost (MC) 2.56 1.32 1.54
Price (P ) 2.78 2.16 2.02
P MC 1.09 1.63 1.32
Total Quantity 5.67 21.8 25.4
Total Prot 5.12 26.0 22.8
Consumer Surplus 0.619 9.14 12.4
Aggregate Static Surplus 5.74 35.12 35.16
The monopoly in state (10; 0) exerts its market power to restrict output and raise price to
2.16 compared to the duopolys 2.02. Per period consumer surplus as a consequence falls from
12.4 to 9.14, a change of 3.3. But the markets strong scale economies gives the monopolist a
marginal cost of 1.38 compared to the duopolistsmarginal cost of 1.54. This results in total
prots in the (10; 0) monopoly being 26.0 instead of 22.8 in the (5; 5) duopoly, an increase of
3.2. Aggregate static surplus in the (10; 0) state is therefore almost identical to that in the
(5; 5) state.
Turning to investment costs, we assume that the capital augmentation cost for a given unit
of capital is independently drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval [3; 6], while the
greeneld investment cost cg is drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval [6; 7]. Firms
discount factor is  = 0:8, which corresponds to a period length of about 5 years. Each unit
of capital depreciates independently with probability d = 0:2 per period. We take the state
space to be f0; 1; : : : ; 20g2, so each active rm can accumulate up to 20 units of capital. In
these markets, rms almost never end up outside of the quadrant f0; 1; : : : ; 10g2; we allow for
capital levels up to 20 so that we can calculate values for mergers and avoid boundary e¤ects.
Finally, we assume that proposal and blocking costs are uniformly distributed on [0,1].
4.2 Equilibrium with No Mergers Allowed
We begin by examining equilibria in these markets when no mergers are allowed.13 Figure 1
shows the resulting beginning-of-period steady state distribution in the intermediate market.
13We have assembled the data that we have generated into large Excel workbooks that each con-
tain for each equilibrium, rst, a detailed description of the equilibrium strategies of the rms and, for
Markov perfect merger policies, of the antitrust authority and, second, a full set of performance sta-
tistics. All of the tables and some of the gures that we include in the paper are lifted whole
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Figure 1: Beginning-of-period steady state distribution over states in the intermediate market
with no mergers allowed. The height of each pin indicates the probability of being in a particular
state.
The horizontal plane shows the quadrant f0; 1; : : : ; 10g2 of the state space, while the height of
each pin represents the probability that the industry is in a given state at the beginning of the
period. As can be seen there, the industry spends most of its time in duopoly states in which
both rms are active, but also spends roughly 18 percent of the time in monopoly states. In
fact, if the industry nds itself in a monopoly state, it can stay there a long time; for example,
starting in state (5; 0), the probability that it is in a monopoly 5 periods later is 0.84. Figure
2 shows the one-period transition probabilities starting from state (5; 0). Figure 3 illustrates
the equilibrium transitions more generally. In that gure, each arrow represents the average
movement over ve periods starting in each state. The lack of movement toward duopoly from
state (5; 0) is also evident there.
There are two cost-based reasons why it is so hard for an entrant starting in state (5; 0)
to catch up. First, the entrant pays much more per unit of capital purchased: the large rm
can add a unit of capital using the lowest of its ve cost draws from the uniform distribution
on [3; 6], whereas the entrant (who chooses to add at most 1 unit) has to engage in greeneld
investment using a cost draw from the uniform distribution on [6; 7]. Second, the large rm
enjoys signicant scale economies: with a capital level of 5 its marginal cost as a monopolist is
1.70 while setting a price of 2.35. If the potential entrant should enter with 2 units of capital,
then at state (5; 2) the dominant rm sells quantity 14.6 at a price of 2.18 with a marginal cost
of 1.62. The entering rm sells 6.7 units with a marginal cost of 1.92. Prots are 18.6 and 5.1
from these workbooks. These notebooks are posted on the web as part of our Online Appendix at
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/satterthwaite/research/researchpage.html. They enable the
reader to explore our results much as we have explored them.
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Figure 2: One-period transition from the state (5,0) in the intermediate market with no mergers
allowed.
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Figure 3: Arrows show the expected transitions over 5 periods in the intermediate market with
no mergers allowed.
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Figure 4: Beginning-of-period steady state distribution over states in the small market with
no mergers allowed.
respectively.
Figures 4 through 7 show the steady state distributions and ve-period transitions for the
small and large markets. The small market is in a monopoly state almost 60 percent of the
time, while the large market nds itself in such a state only a little over 2 percent of the time.
The equilibria involve larger capital levels as the market size grows.
The left-hand side of Table 2 describes some features of the no-mergers equilibria in the
three markets. The second and third rows from the bottom show the probability of being in
a monopoly state at the output competition stage 5 (in the no-mergers case, this is the same
as the probability of being in a monopoly state at the beginning of the period), as well as the
probability of being in neither a monopoly nor a near-monopoly state (% minfK1;K2g  2).
Also shown are the beginning-of-period average total capital, average total output, aggregate
value, and consumer value, each of which is not surprisingly increasing in market size. Finally,
the average price is somewhat lower the larger the market.
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Figure 5: Arrows show the expected transitions over 5 periods in the small market with no
mergers allowed.
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Figure 6: Beginning-of-period steady state distribution over states in the large market with no
mergers allowed.
19
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Figure 7: Arrows show the expected transitions over 5 periods in the large market with no
mergers allowed.
Table 2 : Performance Measures in Three Markets Under
No Mergers Allowed and All Mergers Allowed
No Mergers Allowed All Mergers Allowed
Performance measure14 Small Intermediate Large Small Intermediate Large
Avg. Consumer Value 31.8 48.1 61.3 28.8 35.8 44.1
Avg. Incumbent Value 57.8 69.4 81.0 56.3 68.1 80.8
Avg. Entrant Value - - - 1.1 1.9 2.2
Avg. Aggregate Value 89.6 117.5 142.3 86.2 105.8 127.2
Avg. Price 2.25 2.15 2.10 2.28 2.26 2.24
Avg. Quantity 16.5 22.2 27.0 15.8 19.2 22.9
Avg. Total capital 5.79 7.98 9.58 5.88 7.01 8.29
Merger frequency - - - 33.9% 37.7% 33.6%
% in monopoly 58.2% 18.6% 2.3% 95.2% 86.0% 68.4%
% minfK1;K2g  2 35.9% 75.7% 94.4% 0.1% 0.9% 3.8%
4.3 Equilibria with All Mergers Allowed
Equilibria with all mergers allowed are quite di¤erent. Figure 8 shows, for the intermediate
market, the beginning-of-period steady state distribution over states that this equilibrium
generates as well as the probability that a merger actually happens in each state. As before, the
steady state distribution (at the start of the period, before mergers occur) is represented by the
14All values are ex ante (beginning-of-period) values, while the performance measures in the last two rows
are at the output competition stage (stage 5).
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Figure 8: Beginning-of-period steady state distribution over states in the intermediate market
with all mergers allowed. Darker shading indicates a merger is more likely to happen.
height of the pins. Now, in addition, each cell in which mergers occur with positive probability
is shaded from light to dark grey, with a darker shade representing a higher probability of a
merger happening in a state; cells in which mergers do not occur are unshaded. For example,
a merger happens with probability 1 in state (3; 3), with probability zero in state (2; 2), and
with probability 0.59 in state (2; 3). As is apparent, the rms do not merge in all states, even
though they would be allowed to. In particular, in states in which their capital stocks are both
low, a merger would allow a new entrant to come into the industry, dissipating the gains from
merger.
The next-to-last column of Table 2 shows the properties of the all-mergers-allowed equilibria
in the intermediate market. The third row from the bottom shows that mergers happen 37.7%
of the time. This results in the market being in a monopoly state (at the time of output
competition) 86.0% of the time, and in a near monopoly 99.1% of the time. As a result of
allowing mergers, average output falls from 22.2 to 19.2, while the average price rises from 2.15
to 2.26. Average total capital falls from 7.98 to 7.01. Also shown are beginning-of-period
consumer, incumbent, entrant, and aggregate values. Not surprisingly, the change in policy
leads to substantial negative changes in consumer value, which falls from 48.1 to 35.8. More
surprisingly, average incumbent value falls despite the fact that the rms are now allowed to
merge whenever they want. This is despite the success that unrestricted mergers have from
the rmspoint of view in raising expected price, reducing expected quantity, and limiting
total capital. Even once one accounts for future entrantsvalue, producer value (the sum of
incumbent and entrant values) barely rises. Combined with the dramatic reduction in consumer
value, aggregate value falls substantially, from 117.5 to 105.8.
It is interesting to explore further the reasons behind these results. Consider, rst, the
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reduction in total capital. Allowing mergers does two things. First, it changes the states
in which investments are taking place by moving the market to monopoly positions. The
average capital addition in the no-mergers steady state is 1:99. If we keep rmsinvestment
behavior xed at their no-mergers equilibrium levels, but change the weighting over states to
be that in the all-mergers-allowed steady state, the average capital addition drops to 1:46.15
Second, rms investment policies change; holding the distribution over states xed at the
all-mergers-allowed steady state and changing investment behavior to that in the all-mergers-
allowed equilibrium increases average capital additions from 1:46 to 1:76. Thus, the reduction
in total capital is due to the induced change in the steady state distribution rather than less
aggressive investment behavior.
To understand the change in investment behavior, consider how the prospect of merger
a¤ects the incentive for a rm i to invest in state (Ki;K i) if its rival does not. When
mergers are not allowed, this incentive comes from the marginal e¤ect on the rms value,
@V (Ki;K i)=@Ki. When, instead, a merger is certain to occur in the next period, the e¤ect of
investment on rm is gains from merger matters as well. Specically, the marginal e¤ect on
a rms value is @V (Ki;K i)=@Ki+ (1=2)@G(Ki;K i)=@Ki, where G(Ki;K i)=@Ki is the
e¤ect of Ki on the gain from merger dened in (1). In the all-mergers-allowed steady state,
the rms nd themselves in states where @G(Ki;K i)=@Ki is positive 100% of the time.16 ;17
Why does average producer value not rise when all mergers are allowed? When all mergers
are allowed, an entrant with zero capital frequently invests with the hope of being bought
out, that is, we see a great deal of entry for buyout [Rasmusen (1988)]. Indeed, entrants
invest much more than when no mergers are allowed. Figure 10 shows the one-period transition
probabilities for an entrant in state (5; 0) when all mergers are allowed, which can be compared
to Figure 2 that shows the same one-period transitions when no mergers are allowed. The
probability that the entrant invests is 0.58 in the former case, versus 0.04 in the latter. Further,
a merger happens 49% of the time after the entrant invests when all mergers are allowed. The
two gures also show that the entrants increased incentive lowers the incentive of the incumbent
to invest.
Unfortunately for producer value, the entrants investments are made, on average, at high
cost. Figure 9 illustrates the destructiveness of this behavior. It shows for each state the change
in the row rms (rm 1) beginning-of-period value induced by a switch from a no-merger policy
to an all-mergers-allowed policy. As can be seen there, in most states the row rms value is
enhanced by this change in policy, but in monopoly states in which the monopolist has at
least 3 units of capital, the monopolists value falls substantially due to the entry-for buyout
behavior of the entrant who has no capital. This loss swamps the benecial e¤ect on entrant
value of allowing mergers, resulting in large reductions in producer value in these monopoly
states. Given the likelihood that the rms end up in such states, steady state producer value
falls.
15The average capital addition in the all-mergers-allowed steady state is 1.76. Keeping investment behavior
xed at the all-mergers-allowed equilibrium behavior and reweighting by the steady state probabilities in the
no-mergers equilibrium, the average capital addition increases from 1.76 to 2.24.
16 In the no-mergers steady state, they are in states in which @G(Ki;K i)=@Ki is positive 97.5% of the
time.
17This calculation looks at the e¤ect of allowing mergers on investment incentives holding the interim value
function xed. Of course, in reality, allowing mergers will also alter this value function.
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Figure 9: Beginning-of-period value of the row rm (rm 1) in the all-mergers-allowed equilib-
rium minus its value in the no-mergers equilibrium.
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Figure 10: One-period transition from the state (5,0) in the intermediate market with all
mergers allowed.
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Figure 11: Private incentive of the row rm (rm 1) to invest minus the social incentive for
the row rm to invest in the intermediate market with all mergers allowed.
The entry-for-buyout incentive also reduces aggregate value. To illustrate why, Figure 11
shows the di¤erence between the private and social incentives to invest when all mergers are
allowed. Specically, it shows, starting in each state (K1;K2), the e¤ects of the row rm adding
one unit of capital on its value less its e¤ect on aggregate value (so positive numbers indicate
a socially excessive incentive to invest, while negative numbers indicate a socially insu¢ cient
incentive). As can be seen there, dominant rms generally have insu¢ cient incentives, while
entrants have excessive incentives. A very similar pattern emerges if instead no mergers are
allowed. The entry-for-buyout phenomenon therefore causes a shift in investment away from the
dominant rm, whose incentives are already insu¢ cient, toward the entrant, whose incentives
are excessive.
Similar welfare e¤ects arise for identical reasons in the small and large markets, as is evident
in Table 3.
5 Optimal Merger Policy
In this section we analyze the antitrust authoritys optimal merger approval policy for both an
AV and a CV welfare criterion. In our discussion we focus initially on the intermediate market
analyzed in the previous section; we discuss the results for the small and large markets at the
end of the section. For each market size we consider both no-commitment and commitment
policies and contrast the resulting performance measures.
5.1 Feasible Policies
We consider two di¤erent types of settings, depending upon whether or not the authority can
commit to its decision in a given state:
No Commitment (Markov perfect policy). In this setting the antitrust authority, like
each of the rms, is a player in a dynamic stochastic game. Recall from Sections 2 and 3 that
if at the beginning of the period the state is (K1;K2) and the rms submit a merger proposal,
then the authority privately draws a random blocking cost b and blocks the merger only if the
gain from the merger is less than the cost of blocking the merger: W (K1;K2) <  b, where
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W (K1;K2) is the welfare gain from the merger. This rule, from the rmsviewpoint, gives an
approval policy of a (K1;K2) = 1 H ( W (K1;K2)) : Appealing to the one-stage deviation
principle, a() is a Markov-perfect merger policy if and only if the authority has no incentive
to deviate from a() at any state (K1;K2), assuming that in the continuation game it follows
a() and the rms follow their Markov perfect strategies that a() induces.
Commitment. In this setting we assume that the antitrust authority commits to a pure
action a(K1;K2) 2 f0; 1g for each state (K1;K2) where a(K1;K2) = 1 if the merger is approved
and a(K1;K2) = 0 if it is blocked. Observe that there are 2100 possible deterministic sym-
metric merger policies. Thus, for computational reasons, we restrict the space of admissible
commitment policies to two classes.18
1. Herndahl-Based Policy. Under this type of policy, a proposed merger in state (K1;K2)
is approved if and only if the induced change in the capital stock-based Herndahl index
is below a threshold H:
H(K1;K2)  H(K1 +K2; 0) H(K1;K2)  H
where H(K1;K2) is the capital stock-based Herndahl index in state (K1;K2) and H is
the authoritys policy variable.19 ;20 For illustration, Figure 12(a) shows the policy H =
0:35 where states with a(K1;K2) = 1 are shaded (only states with maxfK1;K2g  10
are shown), while Figure 12(b) shows the policy H = 0:2.
2. Capital-Stock-based Policy Under this type of policy, a proposed merger in state (K1;K2)
is approved if and only if K1 + K2 =2 [K;K] and minfK1;K2g  Ki where K, K,
and Ki are the authoritys policy variables.
21 Figure 12(c), for example depicts the
policy (K;K;Ki) = (4; 10; 1) where states with a(K1;K2) = 1 are shaded (only states
with maxfK1;K2g  10 are shown), while Figure 12(d) shows the policy (K;K;Ki) =
(4; 10; 3).
As observed earlier, under a commitment policy the antitrust authority never incurs any block-
ing costs since if it commits to block a merger in state (K1;K2) the merger will not be proposed
in the rst place. We compute optimal commitment policies when the authoritys goal is max-
imization of the steady-state level of its welfare criterion (AV or CV) and when, for the case
of a new, infant industry, its goal is maximization of its welfare criterion in state (0,0).
18The particular form these simple commitment policies take is partly motivated by which mergers are AV-
increasing as one-shot deviations.
19To retain computational tractability we discretize the policy space: H 2 f0:075; 0:075 + ; 0:075 +
2; :::; 0:4 ; 0:4g, where  = 0:025.
20Because there are only two rms, H(K1 +K2; 0) = H(0;K1 +K2) = 1, so H(K1;K2) = 1 H(K1;K2).
Therefore a merger is approved if and only if H(K1;K2)  1   H. Thus, under the Herndahl-based
policy mergers are only approved if the beginning-of-period Herndahl is su¢ ciently high. Consequently, the
Herndahl-based policy is, in e¤ect, a policy that approves mergers between a dominant and a failingrm.
21To retain computational tractability we discretize the policy space: K 2 f2; 4; :::; 10; 12g, K 2
f6; 8; :::; 18; 20g and Ki 2 f1; 2; :::; 6; 7g.
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Figure 12: Panels (a) and (b) show Herndahl-based commitment policies, whereas panels (c)
and (d) show capital-stock-based commitment policies. (a) is H = 0:35, (b) is H = 0:2, (c)
is (K;K;Ki) = (4; 10; 1), (d) is (K;K;Ki) = (4; 10; 3). The shaded states are those in which
a(K1;K2) = 1.
5.2 Static Benchmarks
As a benchmark, and to understand some of the forces behind the optimal merger policy,
Figure 13 shows for the intermediate market the static change in consumer surplus [panel (a)]
and aggregate surplus [panel (b)] from allowing a merger (the gures show only states with
maxfK1;K2g  10; states with positive surplus e¤ects are shaded). This is the change in CS
or AS due to production and consumption in the period the merger occurs.
In the intermediate market, only in state (K1;K2) = (1; 1) does a merger generate a static
increase in consumer surplus, and there the gain is only 0:1.22 In contrast, many mergers
increase aggregate surplus. In general, these tend to be states in which the total capital in the
industry is not too large: in the intermediate market, there is a static gain in aggregate surplus
in any state in which total capital is not more than 10.23 (There are also asymmetric states with
total capital above that level in which a merger creates a static aggregate surplus gain.) The
gains in aggregate surplus are generally smaller the larger is the total capital in the industry.24
22A merger among symmetrically-positioned rms increases consumer surplus if and only if the marginal cost
reduction at the pre-merger output Q of the merging rms, CQ(QjK)   CQ(2Qj2K), exceeds the pre-merger
price cost margin, P (2Q)  CQ(QjK); see Farrell and Shapiro (1990) and Nocke and Whinston (2010).
23The only exception is state (5; 5) where the static gain in aggregate surplus is approximately zero.
24To understand this result, observe that the change in aggregate surplus from a merger in a symmetric state
is approximately
Q

Q
Q

(P  MC) 

1  Q
Q

ACM
ACM

ACM

;
where (P  MC) is the premerger price-cost margin, ACM is the average cost if no merger occurs but the
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Figure 13: Static change in (a) consumer surplus and (b) aggregate surplus from a merger in
the intermediate market.
An increase in the asymmetry of capital positions, holding total capital xed, has varying
e¤ects on the static gains in aggregate surplus from a merger. This gain gets smaller with
increased asymmetry at low levels of total capital, but grows larger with increased asymmetry
at greater levels of total capital.
Finally, rms always have a static prot gain from merging, as a merger creates a monopoly
in the period in which it occurs.
5.3 Markov Perfect Policy
Turning to the optimal dynamic policy, we rst examine the Markov perfect merger policy. To
do so, we start with the policy of allowing no mergers and the associated equilibrium strategies
for the rms (discussed in Section 4), and iteratively update the antitrust authoritys policy and
the rms strategies until we converge to an equilibrium. In the rst iteration, we identify for
each state (K1;K2) the antitrust authoritys optimal approval rule given its expectation that
its own behavior in the future will be to approve no mergers and that the rms will conform to
their equilibrium strategies given that no-mergers policy. We then update rmsequilibrium
strategies given this new approval policy by the antitrust authority. We continue to iterate in
output level changes to its post-merger level, and ACM is the change in average cost at the post-merger
output level due to the combination of capital. At larger capital levels, (P   MC) and jQ=Qj are both
greater, (ACM=ACM ) is unchanged, and ACM is smaller, making the sign of the e¤ect on aggregate surplus
more likely to be negative. For example, (P  MC) is 0:32 at state (2; 2) and 0:45 at state (4; 4), (Q=Q) is
 0:062 at (2; 2) and  0:125 at (4; 4), and ACM is 27% lower at (4; 4) than at (2; 2).
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Figure 14: E¤ect of a one-time merger on (a) CV and (b) AV in the intermediate market. Each
cell shows the change in CV or AV from a merger in a given state. Shaded cells are those in
which the change is positive.
this fashion until the antitrust authority has no incentive to deviate from its current policy.25
Figures 14 and 15 show the rst step in this iteration process. Figure 14 shows for each
state the gain (before blocking costs) in CV or AV from a one-time merger approval given the
expectation that no mergers will be approved in the future and that rmsstrategies will be
the ones that form an equilibrium given that no mergers would be allowed. For both the CV
and AV welfare criteria, the set of states in which there is a gain (before blocking costs) from
a one-time merger approval is very close to the set of states in which a merger is statically
benecial. For example, the merger increases CV in state (1; 1) where the gain is 1.1. So, with
a CV criterion, a merger is approved with probability one in that state. In all other states the
change in CV is less than -1, so with blocking costs drawn from the uniform distribution on
[0; 1] a merger is blocked with probability 1 in all of these states. In contrast, every state with
total capital no greater than 10 has an increase in AV from merger approval (except state (5; 5)
where the gain is approximately zero). We will let a(1)() denote the policy that emerges from
this rst step in the iteration. Figure 15 shows the resulting probabilities of merger approval
in each state with the AV criterion. Given this new policy a(1)(), we complete the iteration
step by identifying rmsnew equilibrium proposal and investment strategies, which we denote
by [ (1)(); (1)()].
In the next step of the iteration process we determine the gains from a one-time merger
approval in each state given that the antitrust authority will follow policy a(1)() in the future,
and rmsbehavior is given by proposal and investment strategies ( (1)(); (1)()): When we
25For reasons of computational e¢ ciency and to aid with convergence, this is not exactly what our code does.
The discussion of these iterations serves to illustrate the economics.
28
Figure 15: First policy iteration according to (a) CV criterion and (b) AV criterion in the
intermediate market. Each cell shows the probability a(1)(K1;K2) (stated as a %) that a
merger is approved.
do this for the CV criterion, there is no change in the approval probabilities, so the approval
policy shown in Figure 15(a) is in fact a Markov perfect policy. This equilibrium is essentially
identical to the no-mergers equilibrium of Section 4.26
For the AV criterion, however, the optimal policy changes dramatically in the second it-
eration. Figure 16 shows for each state the gain in AV (before blocking costs) from a one-
time merger approval given the expectation that the antitrust authority will follow policy
a(1)() in the future and that rmsstrategies will be ( (1)(); (1)()). Only states in which
minfK1;K2g  2 (and not all of them) have gains in AV from merger approval. Due to block-
ing costs, in policy a(2)() the antitrust authority prevents with certainty only those mergers
that cause AV to fall by at least 1:0. States with a positive probability of merger approval
given the blocking costs are those with minfK1;K2g  3, plus state (4; 4).
While the analysis of Section 4 shows how merger policy can a¤ect investment, we see
here the reverse e¤ect with the AV criterion: Firmsinvestment policies have a dramatic e¤ect
on the antitrust authoritys best-response approval policy in the absence of commitment. To
understand this e¤ect, observe that once the merger policy changes from no mergers being
allowed to policy a(1)(), the investment behavior of the rms (captured in (1)()) changes
dramatically, especially for new entrants. As policy a(1)() allows many mergers, these changes
in rmsbehavior are similar to those we saw in Section 4 when all mergers were allowed.
26Under a Markov perfect policy, a merger is allowed in state (1,1), but it is not protable for the rms.
29
Figure 16: Change in AV from a merger given rmsbehavior ( (1)(); (1)()) after the rst
policy iteration a(1)() in the intermediate market.
Table 3: Investments Starting at (5; 0)
No-mergers equilibrium Investment policy (1)()
Capital addition rm 0 rm 5 rm 0 rm 5
0 96% 0% 29% 3%
1 4% 8% 68% 39%
2 0% 66% 3% 48%
3 0% 25% 0% 9%
4 0% 1% 0% 0%
For example, starting at state (5; 0) the distributions of capital additions by the two rms
when no mergers are allowed and under policy a(1)() are shown in Table 3. As can be seen
in that table, the entrant invests only with a 4% probability at state (5; 0) when mergers are
not allowed, but under policy a(1)() that probability changes to 71%. The incumbent, on the
other hand, invests less under policy a(1)(). The entrant is doing this because of the prospect
that he will get bought out. A merger happens with a high probability in the rst period after
this investment, provided the entrants new unit of capital does not immediately depreciate.
Even if it does not occur immediately, Table 4 shows that starting from state (5; 0) a merger
is almost certain within a small number of periods.
Table 4 : Probability of a Merger if Industry is in
State (5;0) at Start of Period 1
Period 1 2 3 4 5
Cumulative merger probability 29:1% 61:8% 80:5% 90:1% 95:0%
When the authority adopts policy a(1)(), monopolists generally have insu¢ cient investment
incentives, while entrants incentives are too large leading them to invest at high cost. The
policy-induced change in rmsinvestment behavior makes the movement to a monopoly state
due to a merger much less attractive for the antitrust authority, causing the authoritys second-
step policy a(2)() to be much more restrictive in comparison to a(1)().
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Figure 17: Markov perfect policy (AV criterion, intermediate market): probabilities mergers
are (a) allowed, (b) proposed, and (c) happen.
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Figure 18: Beginning-of-period steady state distribution of the equilibrium generated by the
Markov perfect policy (AV criterion) in the intermediate market. The height of each pin indi-
cates the steady state probability of that state. The shading of the cell reects the probability
of a merger happening (with a darker grey representing a higher probability).
The AV-maximizing Markov perfect policy is even more restrictive than policy a(2)().
Figure 17 shows the merger acceptance probabilities, merger proposal probabilities, and the
probabilities a merger actually occurs in various states under this Markov perfect policy. For
states in which each rm has no more than 10 units of capital, the antitrust authority approves
a proposed merger with probability one only in states (1; 1), (2; 1), and (1; 2). The author-
ity approves a proposed merger with positive probability in near-monopoly states in which
minfK1;K2g = 1, as well as in states (2; 2), (3; 2), and (2; 3). Overall, the policy resembles
one in which mergers are approved if one of the rms is failing. Given this policy, mergers
are proposed with probability one in all of these states, except in state (1; 1), where a merger
is never proposed, and in states (2; 1), and (1; 2), where a merger is proposed with less than
full probability.
Figure 18 shows the steady state distribution for the Markov perfect policy. Table 5 shows
some summary statistics for the Markov perfect policy equilibrium under the AV criterion, and
for equilibria when either no mergers or all mergers are allowed. In the steady state induced by
the Markov perfect policy, the industry is in a monopoly state at the time of static competition
49.4% of the time, and in near-monopoly states 55.8% of the time. Compared to the steady
state induced when no mergers are allowed, the economy spends much more time in such states.
In addition, the average aggregate capital level is lower (7.98 vs. 7.65). The reason is the shift
in the steady state distribution toward more asymmetric states, in which investments are lower.
For example, the average total capital addition (gross of depreciation) by the two rms in the
no-mergers steady state is 1.99 units of capital. Keeping rmsinvestment strategies xed but
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changing the steady state distribution to the one in the Markov perfect equilibrium lowers the
average capital addition to 1.75. If we then change rmsinvestment strategies to that in the
Markov perfect equilibrium, the average capital addition rises from 1.75 to 1.92.
Table 5: Performance Measures for the Intermediate Market under Various Policies
Performance measure27
NoMergers/
MP-CV
All
Mergers
MP-AV
Commitment
(CV and AV)
Planner
Avg. Consumer value 48.1 35.8 43.3 49.3 39.2
Avg. Incumbent value 69.4 68.1 69.9 68.8 82.1
Avg. Entrant value 0.0 1.9 0.5 0.0 0.0
Avg. Blocking cost 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0
Avg. Aggregate Value 117.5 105.8 113.6 118.1 121.3
Avg. Price 2.15 2.26 2.19 2.14 2.23
Avg. Quantity 22.2 19.2 21.0 22.5 20.1
Avg. Total capital 7.98 7.01 7.65 8.17 8.08
Merger frequency 0.0% 37.7% 16.1% 3.0% 0.0%
% in monopoly 18.6% 86.0% 49.4% 14.3% 100.0%
% minfK1;K2g  2 75.7% 0.9% 44.2% 78.8% 0.0%
State (0,0) Consumer Value 30.3 23.9 25.6 30.4 25.3
State (0,0) Aggregate Value 36.7 34.0 35.5 36.7 41.8
Most strikingly, the Markov perfect policy equilibrium with the AV criterion results in a
level of steady state AV that is about 3% lower than with the no-mergers policy: AV is 113.6
compared to 117.5 when no mergers are allowed. Firms are slightly better o¤ while consumers
are much worse o¤: CV is 43.3 (vs. 48.1) and producer value is 70.4 (vs. 69.4). Consumers
are harmed both from the monopoly pricing and the reduction in capital, both of which lead
to higher prices.
The nding that the Markov perfect policy with the AV criterion performs worse than the
no-mergers policy but better than the all-mergers-allowed policy holds not only for the steady
state averages of AV and CV but also for a newindustry: at state (0,0), the AV (resp. CV)
value of the Markov perfect policy is 35.5 (25.6), that of the no-mergers policy 36.7 (30.3),
while that of the all-mergers-allowed policy is only 34.0 (23.9).
5.4 Commitment Policy
We now turn to the optimal commitment policy in the intermediate market. By this we
mean the policy that leads to the largest steady state level of expected welfare, either CV
or AV depending on the welfare criterion.28 We also consider the commitment policy that
27All values are ex ante (beginning-of-period) values, while the performance measures in the last two rows
are at the output competition stage (stage 5).
28This policy will generally di¤er from the policy that would be optimal given that the industry is starting
in a particular state (K1;K2).
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Figure 19: Beginning-of-period steady state distribution of the equilibrium generated by the
optimal commitment policy (AV and CV criteria) in the intermediate market. The height
of each pin indicates the steady state probability of that state. Cells in which mergers are
proposed and approved are darkly shaded.
maximizes the expected welfare of a newindustry at state (0,0). In contrast to the Markov
perfect policy, the planner in the commitment case considers the impact his policy has on rms
strategies.29
In the intermediate market, the optimal commitment policy  for either a CV or AV
standard  is the Herndahl-type policy H = 0:225. For states in which each rm has no
more than 10 units of capital, this policy involves approving a merger only when the smaller
rm has one unit of capital and the larger rm has at least seven units. Wherever a merger
is approved under this policy, it is also highly protable to the merging rms and is proposed
with probability one. With mergers occuring only 3 percent of the time, this policy is fairly
close to the no-mergers policy.
Figure 19 shows the steady state distribution of the equilibrium induced by the optimal
commitment policy. Table 5 shows steady state averages of various performance measures for
this policy. The ability to commit leads to a 4% gain in AV compared to the Markov perfect
policy with the AV criterion, and a 2.5% gain in CV compared to the Markov perfect policy
with the CV criterion.
Strikingly, even though mergers move the industry to a monopoly state, the industry spends
less time in a monopoly state (at the static competition stage) with the optimal commitment
policy than under the no-mergers policy (14.3% vs. 18.6%), and capital levels are higher (8.17
29A less obvious di¤erence is that under commitment the antitrust authority considers the impact its policy
has on proposal costs, while without commitment those costs are considered to be sunk at the time a merger is
reviewed. [A similar point arises in Besanko and Spulber (1992).]
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Figure 20: Five-period transitions from state (5,0) under the optimal commitment policy. The
height of each pin indicates the probability of the industry being in that state. Cells in which
mergers are proposed and approved are darkly shaded.
vs. 7.98). As can be seen in Figures 20 and 21, the reason there is less monopoly is that the
prospect of merger induces entrants to invest, but the limited set of states in which mergers are
allowed results in the industry often moving to symmetric duopoly positions following these
investments. Indeed, the probability that the industry is in a monopoly state after ve periods
starting from state (5; 0) is much lower than under the no-mergers policy: 0.45 vs. 0.84. The
greater movement to symmetric, duopolistic states from monopoly ones can also be seen by
comparing Figure 22 to Figure 3.
The greater permissiveness of the commitment policy compared to the no-mergers policy
increases average AV because of this shift in the steady state distribution toward more symmet-
ric duopoly states. As a general matter aggregate value falls in some states because of allowing
these mergers and rises in others (aggregate value particularly falls in monopoly states because
the commitment policy encourages entry for buyout). Were the distribution over states not
to change, these changes in the value function would lead average aggregate value to fall from
117.5 to 116.9; the change in the steady state distribution, however, raises average aggregate
value to 118.1.
While full commitment to a policy may be di¢ cult to achieve, an alternative is to endow
the antitrust authority with an objective that may not be the true social objective. In this
regard, note that the steady-state level of AV under the Markov perfect merger policy when the
antitrust authority has a CV objective is higher than that when it has an AV objective. Thus,
when the antitrust authority cannot commit, a CV-maximizing antitrust authority is better
for AV in this market than an AV-maximizing authority. This is consistent with a suggestion of
Lyons (2002), but arises because of the policys e¤ect on investment, rather than by inducing
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Figure 21: Five-period transitions from state (5,0) under the no-mergers policy. The height of
each pin indicates the probability of the industry being in that state.
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Figure 22: Arrows show the expected transitions over 5 periods under the optimal commitment
policy.
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more desirable merger proposals.
We also consider the optimal commitment policy for a new industry, which maximizes the
welfare level (either AV or CV, depending on the authoritys objective function) at state (0,0).
In searching for this policy, we proceed in two steps. First, we identify the state (0,0) welfare-
maximizing policy in the class of Herndahl-based or capital-stock-based commitment policies.
Second, we identify the state-(0,0)-welfare-maximizing policy in the space of all feasible (history
independent) commitment policies within the boxf(K1;K2)j0  Ki  4, i = 1; 2g, assuming
that the authority commits to the policy identied in step 1 for states outside this box. The
rationale for the second step is that the policy in states with small capital levels is likely to
matter most when searching for the optimal commitment policy starting from state (0; 0).
It turns out that the optimal commitment policy from state (0,0) allows mergers in very
few states. For the AV objective, the authority allows mergers only in states (K1;K2) such
that Ki 2 f1; 2g, i = 1; 2. However, as a merger in state (1; 1) is never (and in states (1; 2) and
(2; 1) only rarely) protable, this is almost equivalent to allowing mergers only in state (2; 2).
The resulting AV (resp. CV) level is 37.2 (26.6), whereas under the no-mergers policy it is
36.7 (30.3). For the CV objective, the state (0,0) optimal commitment policy is a no-mergers
policy.
5.5 Merger Policy in the Small and Large Markets
In this subsection, we describe our results for the optimal merger policy in the small and large
markets, and compare them to our results for the intermediate market.
The static welfare e¤ects of mergers are very similar in the three markets: in all of them
only a merger in state (1; 1) increases static consumer surplus, and in all of them, a merger in
state (K1;K2) increases static aggregate surplus unless both K1 and K2 are large,with the
set of statically aggregate surplus-increasing mergers being larger in larger markets. Figure
23 shows the set of aggregate surplus-increasing mergers in the small and large markets.
As in the intermediate market, if the antitrust authority pursues a CV goal and cannot
commit, the Markov perfect merger policies in the small and large markets are essentially
equivalent to the no-mergers policy.30
When the antitrust authority pursues instead an AV goal, the Markov perfect merger policy
again results in mergers only in near-monopoly states in which the incumbent is su¢ ciently
large. The larger the market, the more restrictive is the antitrust authority in equilibrium.
Figures 24 and 25 show the steady state distribution and probabilities that a merger happens
in the two markets, while Tables 6 and 7 provide some summary statistics of these equilibria.
The average merger probability is 30.6% in the small market, but only 3.0% in the large market
(versus 16.1% in the intermediate market). In the small market the industry is almost always
(98.6% of the time) in a monopoly state at the (post-merger) output stage, compared to 49.4%
in the intermediate market, and only 8.2% in the large market. Just as in the intermediate
market, absent commitment, the optimal merger policy of a CV-oriented authority induces a
higher value of AV than that of an AV-oriented authority: the respective AV values are 89.6
vs. 87.9 in the small market and 142.3 vs. 141.3 in the large market.
30 In the large market, the authority would approve mergers in states (1; 1), (2; 1), and (1; 2) but such mergers
are not value-enhancing for the rms and therefore never proposed.
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Figure 23: Static change in aggregate surplus for (a) the small market and (b) the large market.
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Figure 24: Beginning-of-period steady state distribution of the equilibrium generated by the
Markov perfect policy (AV criterion) in the small market. The height of each pin indicates
the steady state probability of that state. The shading of the cell reects the probability of a
merger happening (with a darker grey representing a higher probability).
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Figure 25: Beginning-of-period steady state distribution of the equilibrium generated by the
Markov perfect policy (AV criterion) in the large market. The height of each pin indicates
the steady state probability of that state. The shading of the cell reects the probability of a
merger happening (with a darker grey representing a higher probability).
Table 6: Performance Measures for the Small Market under Various Policies
Performance measure31
NoMergers/
MP-CV
MP-AV
Commitment
AV
Commitment
CV
Avg. Consumer value 31.8 29.1 32.9 33.2
Avg. Incumbent value 57.8 58.0 61.0 57.8
Avg. Entrant value 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.1
Avg. Blocking cost 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Avg. Aggregate Value 89.6 87.9 94.0 91.1
Avg. Price 2.25 2.28 2.23 2.23
Avg. Quantity 16.5 15.9 16.9 16.9
Avg. Total capital 5.79 5.98 6.56 6.23
Merger frequency 0.0% 30.6% 6.8% 11.6%
% in monopoly 58.2% 98.6% 68.6% 60.8%
% minfK1;K2g  2 35.9% 0.3% 17.4% 32.3%
State (0,0) Consumer Value 24.0 19.4 5.9 24.1
State (0,0) Aggregate Value 28.4 26.8 27.7 28.3
31All values are ex ante (beginning-of-period) values, while the performance measures in the last two rows
are at the output competition stage (stage 5).
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Table 7: Performance Measures for the Large Market under Various Policies
Performance measure32
NoMergers/
MP-CV
MP-AV
Commitment
AV
Commitment
CV
Avg. Consumer value 61.3 60.1 61.4 61.4
Avg. Incumbent value 81.0 81.1 81.1 80.8
Avg. Entrant value 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Avg. Blocking cost 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0
Avg. Aggregate Value 142.3 141.3 142.5 142.3
Avg. Price 2.10 2.11 2.10 2.10
Avg. Quantity 27.0 26.7 27.0 27.0
Avg. Total capital 9.58 9.49 9.60 9.58
Merger frequency 0.0% 3.0% 0.0% 0.1%
% in monopoly 2.3% 8.2% 2.3% 1.1%
% minfK1;K2g  2 94.4% 87.9% 94.5% 95.5%
State (0,0) Consumer Value 36.4 35.5 36.5 36.4
State (0,0) Aggregate Value 45.6 45.2 45.6 45.6
If the antitrust authority can commit to its policy and pursues a CV goal, then in all
three markets mergers are approved only in near-monopoly states in which the incumbent is
su¢ ciently large. This policy is more restrictive the larger is the market, with the merger
probabilities ranging from 0.1% in the large market to 11.6% in the small market. Figures 26
and 27 show the steady state distributions and optimal merger policy for the small and large
markets.
If the antitrust authority can commit to its policy and pursues an AV goal instead, it
essentially does not approve any mergers in the large market, whereas in the small market it
does approve mergers in states in which both rms are su¢ ciently large (resulting in a merger
probability of 6.8%), which boosts rms investment incentives (resulting in an almost 10%
higher capital level compared to the AV-mazimizing Markov perfect policy). Figures 28 and 29
show the steady state distributions and optimal merger policies for the two markets. Observe
that the optimal commitment policy is more restrictive in larger markets even though the set
of states in which mergers increase static aggregate surplus is larger in larger markets.
Independently of whether the authority pursues a CV or AV objective, the advantage that
commitment has over no commitment is decreasing (both in absolute as well as in relative
terms) with the size of the market. For example, compared to the AV-maximizing Markov
perfect policy, the AV-maximizing commitment policy induces an average AV that is 6.7%
higher in the small market but only 0.8% higher in the large market.
6 Extensions and Robustness
In this section, we investigate several extensions and robustness issues. First, we consider the
problem of a social planner who controls both merger and investment decisions. Second, we
analyze the robustness of our results to reducing the di¤erence in investment costs between
32All values are ex ante (beginning-of-period) values, while the performance measures in the last two rows
are at the output competition stage (stage 5).
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Figure 26: Beginning-of-period steady state distribution of the equilibrium generated by the
best commitment policy (CV criterion) in the small market. The height of each pin indicates
the steady state probability of that state. The shading of the cell reects the probability of a
merger happening (with a darker grey representing a higher probability).
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Figure 27: Beginning-of-period steady state distribution of the equilibrium generated by the
best commitment policy (CV criterion) in the large market. The height of each pin indicates
the steady state probability of that state. The shading of the cell reects the probability of a
merger happening (with a darker grey representing a higher probability).
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Figure 28: Beginning-of-period steady state distribution of the equilibrium generated by the
best commitment policy (AV criterion) in the small market. The height of each pin indicates
the steady state probability of that state. The shading of the cell reects the probability of a
merger happening (with a darker grey representing a higher probability).
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Figure 29: Beginning-of-period steady state distribution of the equilibrium generated by the
best commitment policy (AV criterion) in the large market. The height of each pin indicates
the steady state probability of that state. The shading of the cell reects the probability of a
merger happening (with a darker grey representing a higher probability).
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incumbents and entrants. Third, we investigate changes in the arrival rate of a new entrant on
the optimal merger policy (in the absence of commitment). Finally, we discuss the potential
issue of multiplicity of equilibria. In the Appendix, we consider another variant of the entry
process in which the know-how to produce in the industry is embodied in two owner-managers,
thereby justifying the restriction to at most two active rms at any given point in time.
6.1 The Planners Solution
In this subsection, we consider the solution to the second-best problem where the planner
controls not only rmsmerger decisions but also their investment decisions, taking as given
rmsstatic competition. In our analysis, we conne attention to the intermediate market and
the AV criterion.33
Our analysis above has revealed that the optimal merger policy in the intermediate market
with commitment approves mergers only in near-monopoly states in which the incumbent is
very large. This is even though in many more states a merger raises static aggregate surplus.
As we have seen, the reason why the optimal commitment policy is so restrictive is that a more
permissive policy would lead to adverse e¤ects on investment incentives, and in particular
ine¢ cient entry for buyout. This raises the question of which mergers an AV-maximizing
social planner would approve if he could control not only mergers (independently of their
private protability) but also rms investment decisions (assuming the planner has perfect
information about rmsprivate cost draws), taking as given only that, in every period, rms
compete in a Cournot fashion at stage 5.
Figure 30 shows the steady state distribution for the solution of this second-best problem:
the height of each pin gives the beginning-of-period probability of the corresponding state
in the steady state generated by this policy; the cells in which mergers are approved are
darkly shaded. Two comments are in order. First, as the planner controls not only merger
decisions but also rmsinvestment decisions, the planner does not face a time inconsistency
problem; i.e., the solution is independent of whether or not the planner can commit to his
future decisions. Second, the existence of blocking costs is irrelevant for the solution to the
second-best problem as it can never be optimal from the planners point of view to propose a
merger and subsequently block it in the event blocking costs are su¢ ciently low.
As Figure 30 shows, in the steady state generated by the planners solution, the industry
is always in a monopoly state. A merger is implemented in many states, unless these states
involve high capital levels for both rms. In fact, the set of states in which mergers happen is
almost identical to the set of states in which a merger is statically aggregate surplus-increasing
(for reasons that will be discussed below). Table 5 summarizes various performance measures
of the planners solution. As can be seen from that table, the planners solution does quite a
bit better in terms of AV than the optimal merger policy with commitment (121.3 vs. 118.1).
It does serve consumers very badly, however; worse in fact than the Markov perfect merger
policy (39.2 vs. 43.3), despite a higher average capital level (8.08 vs. 7.65), and nearly as badly
as allowing all mergers. The reason behind this is, of course, the monopolists market power
which leads to low output (20.1, compared to 21.0 under the AV-maximizing Markov perfect
policy, and 22.5 under the optimal merger policy with commitment).
33Similar conclusions hold for the small and large markets.
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Figure 30: Solution to the planners second-best problem (AV criterion) in the intermediate
market. The height of each pin gives the probability of the corresponding state in the steady
state generated by the planners optimal policy. The shading of the cells indicates the merger
probabilities, with a darker shading corresponding to a higher merger probability.
The fact that in the second-best solution the industry is always in a monopoly state may be
surprising at rst. After all, when mergers are not allowed the industry seems to be a workable
duopoly, and in the equilibrium generated by the optimal merger policy with commitment, the
industry spends only 14.3% of the time in a monopoly state. To understand this outcome, sup-
pose rst that the planner could not only control mergers but also costlessly undo previously
approved mergers. Suppose also that there were no merger proposal costs. What would the
planners optimal policy be in that case? In any state (K1;K2), the planner would optimally
implement a merger if and only if the merger increases static aggregate surplus as this is stati-
cally optimal and also does not impede dynamic optimality as the planner controls investment,
the investment technology is merger neutral, and the planner can costlessly undo any previ-
ously approved merger. Now, previously we saw in Figure 13(b) that a merger increases static
aggregate surplus in every state in which K1 + K2  10 (except in state (5; 5) in which the
gain is approximiately zero) and, also, in several additional states in which K1 +K2 > 10. So,
unless the planner wants to spend a large amount of time in states with more than 10 units
of capital, the steady state generated by the planners policy will visit only monopoly states
even if the planner cannot undo previously approved mergers and there are proposal costs 
which is what is going on here.34 Finally, note that this reasoning also explains why the set
of states in which the planner implements mergers almost coincides with the set of statically
34 In the steady state generated by the planners solution, the industry is sometimes (8.3% of the time) in a
monopoly state with more than 10 units of capital, the joint frequencies of states (11; 0).and (0; 11) being 6.1%.
But these are both states that are reachable by aggregate surplus increasing mergers.
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aggregate surplus-increasing mergers. They do not coincide fully because of the presence of
merger proposal costs, which the static criterion does not take into account.
6.2 Entrant Investment E¢ ciency
In our analysis of the welfare e¤ects of various merger policies, entry for buyout plays a
prominent role. When mergers are allowed a new entrants private benet from investing
signicantly exceeds the incremental aggregate value that results from those investments, while
the incremental aggregate value from an incumbents investment exceeds its private benet to
the incumbent. As a result, the entrant invests too much and the incumbent invests too
little. The entrants high cost greeneld investment substitutes for the incumbents lower cost
investment done through capital augmentation and directly causes waste.
In practice, however, entrants investments are not always less e¢ cient than incumbents
investments, and may even be more e¢ cient.35 In this section, we explore this point by
changing the models parameters to close the gap between the investment costs entrants and
incumbents face.
Focusing on the intermediate market, we examine whether this change largely eliminates
the waste that entry for buyout causes by studying the e¤ect of a change from the no-mergers-
allowed policy to the all-mergers-allowed and Markov perfect policies when the antitrust au-
thoritys criterion is AV maximization. Overall, we nd that (i) entry-for-buyout behavior
continues to be prevalent, (ii) its social costs are greatly reduced; (iii) the antitrust authority
is much more willing to allow mergers in the Markov perfect policy; and (iv) with this change,
consumer value falls somewhat more when moving from no mergers allowed to the Markov
perfect policy.
Recall that capital augmentation each period enables a rm with K units of capital, if it
wishes, to double each unit j at a cost cj drawn independently and uniformly from the interval
[c,c] : If it wants to more than double its current stock of capital, then it can purchase additional
greeneld units at constant unit cost cg, where cg is uniformly drawn from [c; cg]. Let s = c  c
and sg = cg   c be the spread of capital augmentation costs and greeneld costs respectively.
In the baseline industry analyzed in the previous sections the values are c = 3; c = 6; cg = 7;
s = 3; and sg = 1: To close the gap between entrant and incumbent investment costs we reduce
s to 1 and sg to 0:25. Since this change, if c were held xed, would reduce rmsinvestment
costs, leading to less monopoly and very di¤erent merger behavior, we simultaneously raise
c to 5.645, which keeps the frequency of monopoly unchanged when no mergers are allowed.
Thus, we have c = 5:645, c = 6:645, cg = 6:895; we refer to these modied parameter values as
the e¢ cient entry environment.
Table 8 shows the results when we switch from our baseline environment (left three columns)
to the e¢ cient entry environment (right three columns). The table reports the same perfor-
mance statistics as before, with the addition of one new measure: Avg. Monop. to Merger
Time.This statistic measures the expected number of periods the industry takes to transi-
tion from a monopoly state to a state in which the incumbents merge.36 Comparing the two
35Henderson (1993) provides dramatic evidence of this in the photolithographic alignment equipment industry
where several generations of entrants supplanted incumbents by more e¢ ciently using their knowledge capital.
36We use the steady state distribution over monopoly states as weights, and exclude state (0; 0).
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environments, we see that entry-for-buyout behavior actually increases when we move to the
e¢ cient entry environment; for example, when all mergers are allowed, the monopoly to merger
time falls from 2.6 to 2.1. However, the costs of this behavior are greatly reduced: AV now falls
only 0.6% when all mergers are allowed (from 87.9 with no mergers to 87.4 when all mergers
are allowed), compared to 10.0% in our baseline case (from 117.5 with no mergers to 105.8 with
all mergers allowed). Because of the reduction in the ine¢ ciency of post-merger investment
behavior, allowing mergers is much more attractive for the antitrust authority, and the Markov
perfect policy results in far more mergers in the e¢ cient entry environment: the probability
of merger is now 42.6% in each period, compared to only 16.1% in our baseline case. Indeed,
the equilibrium is essentially equivalent to the case in which all mergers are allowed. Finally,
this increased merger activity results in a much greater likelihood of the industry being in a
monopoly state (79.4% of the time in the e¢ cient entry environment vs. 49.4% in our baseline
case). As a consequence, there is a somewhat greater reduction in consumer value when moving
from no mergers being allowed to the Markov perfect policy (a reduction of 13.6%, from 34.9
to 30.5 in the e¢ cient entry environment, vs. a reduction of 10.0%, from 48.1 to 43.3).37
Table 8 : Performance Measures for the Ecient Entry Environment
in the Intermediate Market
Baseline Environment E¢ cient Entry Environment
Performance measure38
No
Mergers
All
Mergers
MPP
No
Mergers
All
Mergers
MPP
Avg. Consumer value 48.1 35.8 43.3 34.9 30.5 30.5
Avg. Incumbent value 69.4 68.1 69.9 53.1 54.9 54.9
Avg. Entrant value - 1.9 0.5 - 2.0 2.0
Avg. Blocking Cost - - -0.1 - - 0.0
Avg. Aggregate Value 117.5 105.8 113.6 87.9 87.4 87.4
Avg. Price 2.25 2.36 2.19 2.14 2.20 2.20
Avg. Quantity 22.2 19.2 21.0 18.9 17.7 17.7
Avg. Total capital 7.98 7.01 7.65 5.58 5.66 5.66
Merger frequency 0.0% 37.7% 16.1% 6.8% 42.6% 42.6%
% in monopoly 18.6% 86.0% 49.4% 18.6% 79.4% 79.4%
% minfK1;K2g  2 75.7% 0.9% 44.2% 68.6% 4.2% 4.2%
Avg. Monop. to Merger Time - 2.6 6.1 - 2.1 2.1
37The greater percentage reduction in consumer value in the Markov perfect policy compared to when no
mergers are allowed depends on market size. In results not reported here, we nd that it remains true in the
large market, but in the small market there is no reduction in consumer value from allowing mergers in the
e¢ cient entry environment. The other e¤ects we report here for the intermediate market (continued entry-for-
buyout behavior, reduced cost of that behavior, and greater frequency of mergers) hold as well in the small and
large markets.
38All values are ex ante (beginning-of-period) values, while the performance measures in second and third
rows from the bottom are at the output competition stage (stage 5).
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6.3 Entry Probability
It is generally perceived that the potential anticompetitive e¤ects of horizontal mergers are
mitigated by timely post-merger entry into the industry. For instance, the current (2010) U.S.
Horizontal Merger Guidelines (which are largely based on a consumer welfare standard) state:
A merger is not likely to enhance market power if entry into the market is so easy
that the merged rm and its remaining rivals in the market, either unilaterally
or collectively, could not protably raise price or otherwise reduce competition
compared to the level that would prevail in the absence of the merger. Entry is
that easy if entry would be timely, likely, and su¢ cient in its magnitude, character,
and scope to deter or counteract the competitive e¤ects of concern.
However, the appropriateness of this wisdom may depend on the welfare criterion and on
whether dynamic investment incentives are taken into account.39 To study how the timeliness
of post-merger entry a¤ects the optimal merger policy and the resulting performance of the
industry, we extend the baseline model by introducing a probability e  0 with which a new
entrant arrives at stage 4 whenever the current state of the industry has a single active rm.40
We show that, contrary to what conventional wisdom may suggest, an increase in the timeliness
of post-merger entry may result in fewer mergers occurring under the Markov perfect policy,
for both an AV and a CV standard.
39 It has been remarked before that the possibility of entry need not make a given merger more attractive
for an authority with an aggregate welfare rather than a consumer welfare standard [Whinston (2007); p.
2388]. While new entry is generally viewed as being price-reducing and thus benecial to consumers, it may be
excessive from an aggregate welfare point of view [Mankiw and Whinston (1986)].
40Formally, this requires extending the state space to S0  f 1; 0; 1; :::; 20g2, where Ki =  1 means that
rm i is an entrant who has not yet arrived. The rmsexpected gain from merging, equation (1), is therefore
now given by
G(K1;K2) = eV (K1 +K2; 0) + (1  e)V (K1 +K2; 1)  [V (K1;K2) + V (K2;K1)];
where the rst (second) term on the right-hand side is the probability of new entry (no new entry) occurring
times the continuation value of the merged rm in that event.
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Table 9: Performance Measures for the Intermediate Market
(Markov Perfect Policy, AV Criterion)
Performance measure41 e=1.0 e=0.8 e=0.6 e=0.4 e=0.2 e=0.0
Avg. Consumer value 43.3 41.6 37.4 33.1 30.6 28.0
Avg. Incumbent value 69.9 70.3 70.7 69.6 69.7 70.5
Avg. Entrant value 0.5 0.5 0.9 1.8 1.4 0.0
Avg. Blocking cost -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Avg. Aggregate Value 113.6 112.4 109.0 104.6 101.7 98.5
Avg. Price 2.19 2.21 2.25 2.29 2.32 2.35
Avg. Quantity 21.0 20.6 19.6 18.5 17.7 16.9
Avg. Total capital 7.65 7.50 7.11 6.44 5.86 5.3
Merger frequency 16.1% 19.5% 30.3% 36.7% 20.0% 0.0%
% in monopoly 49.4% 58.9% 83.6% 99.4% 100% 100%
% minfK1;K2g  2 44.2% 35.3% 13.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
We begin our analysis with the Markov perfect policy of an authority that aims at max-
imizing AV in the intermediate market. Table 9 reports the performance measures of the
intermediate market under this policy for di¤erent levels of the entry probability e. Despite
the ine¢ ciencies associated with entry for buyout, welfare declines as entry becomes less timely:
the steady-state levels of CV and AV fall from 43.3 and 113.6, respectively, to 28.0 and 98.5 as
e decreases from 1 to 0. The reason for this nding is that, as e decreases, the industry spends
more and more time in a monopoly state; the steady-state probability of monopoly increases
from 49.4% at e = 1 to 100% at e = 0. This hurts consumers and society a lot in the short run
(for a given level of capital) but even more so in the long run because a monopolist has little
incentive to build capital in the absence of a threat of entry: the average total capital level
decreases from 7.65 to 5.3 as e decreases from 1 to 0.
Table 9 also reveals that the frequency of mergers is non-monotonic in the timeliness of
post-merger entry: as e decreases, the probability that a merger occurs in a randomly selected
period rst increases (from 16.1% at e = 1 to 36.7% at e = 0:4) and then decreases. As a
merger is infeasible in states in which there is only one active rm, this steady-state weighted
merger probability is equal to the probability that there are two active rms times the prob-
ability of a merger conditional on two rms being active, and is bounded from above by the
entry probability e.42 This explains why the merger frequency converges to zero as the entry
probability e becomes small.
To understand why the merger frequency increases as e decreases from 1 to 0.4, consider
the merger probability conditional on two rms being active, which is the product of two
probabilities: the probability that the two active rms propose a merger and the probability
that a proposed merger is approved.
41All values are ex ante (beginning-of-period) values, while the performance measures in the last two rows
are at the output competition stage (stage 5).
42The steady-state weighted merger probability is maximized when the probability of a merger, conditional
on there being two active rms, is equal to one. In that case, the probability that there are two active rms
is equal to the entry probability e, implying that the steady-state weighted merger probability is equal to e as
well.
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Consider rst states in which both rms have at least one unit of capital. As e decreases,
mergers become more protable in such states as the merged rm spends more time in a
monopoly state before a new entrant appears. It follows that the probability of a merger pro-
posal in any given state increases as entry becomes less timely. Moreover, the AV-maximizing
Markov perfect policy tends to become less restrictive as e declines. When the entry probabil-
ity e is high, the Markov perfect policy approves mergers only in states in which at least one
of the rms is su¢ ciently small (as we have seen for e = 1 in Section 5.3). As e decreases, this
approval region increases. For example, a proposed merger in state (3,3) is never approved if
e  0:6 but always approved if e  0:35. In the limit as the entry probability e becomes small,
the set of states in which the authority approves a merger with probability one is very similar
to the set of states in which a merger raises static aggregate surplus: it includes the states
in which total capacity satises K1 + K2  9 and each rm has at least one unit of capacity,
minfK1;K2g  1. In addition, the authority approves mergers with high probability in many
other states. An important factor explaining why the Markov perfect policy becomes less re-
strictive as post-merger entry becomes less timely is that the entry-for-buyout phenomenon
along with its investment distortions disappear in the limit as e becomes small.43
Consider now states in which an entrant has arrived but not yet built any capital. When
the entry probability is one, the authority would always approve a proposed merger in such a
state: approving the merger has no e¤ect on AV, but blocking is costly. However, when the
entry probability is one, such a merger would not be proposed as it is not protable.44 When
the post-merger entry probability is su¢ ciently small, such a merger becomes protable as
the arrival of a new entrant following a merger takes time, allowing the merging rms to reap
monopoly prots in the meantime. As e decreases, rms are therefore more likely to propose
mergers between an entrant and an incumbent. At the same time, the antitrust authority
starts to block mergers, but only in states with very low incumbent capital levels, in which
entrant investment incentives are not excessive. Hence, the probability of a merger between an
entrant and an incumbent becomes positive for e  0:6.
What happens if the authority adopts a CV standard instead? The parameterization of
the intermediate-sized market may not seem ideal to study this question: After all, when
post-merger entry is immediate (e = 1), the CV-maximizing Markov perfect policy is outcome-
equivalent to the no-mergers policy (it approves a merger only in state (1,1) but such a merger
is not protable), as we have seen in Section 5.3. Nevertheless, the relationship between the
timeliness of entry and the steady-state probability of a merger is also non-monotonic under a
CV-maximizing policy: as e decreases, the merger frequency rst increases and then decreases.
This is the result of opposing e¤ects: as post-merger entry becomes less timely, mergers tend
to become more protable on the one hand, but on the other the authoritys approval policy
becomes more restrictive, and the industry spends more time in states in which a merger is
43 If e = 0, the authority approves a proposed merger with probability one in all states in which each rm
has at least one unit of capital, and aggregate capital is less than 10, and even in most states in which one of
the rms has zero capital. The approval region is thus similar to the set of states in which a merger does not
decrease static aggregate surplus, even though the authority does take into account the e¤ect of a merger to
monopoly on future investment.
44When e = 1, a merger in state (K1; 0) or (0;K2) does not a¤ect producer value because the old entrant
gets immediately replaced by a new entrant. As the value of the new entrant is strictly positive, this implies
that the merger must decrease the joint continuation values of the merging rms.
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infeasible because a new entrant has not yet arrived. The only mergers that are sometimes both
proposed and approved are those involving a newly arrived entrant with zero units of capital
and a su¢ ciently large incumbent. For example, at e = 0:4, mergers sometimes happen in
states (0;K2) or (K1; 0) with 14  Ki  6, with the steady state probability of a merger being
1.2 percent. At e = 0:2, mergers happen only in states (0;K2) or (K1; 0) with 20  Ki  7, with
the steady state probability of a merger being 0.4 percent. Given that the merger probability
is very low for all values of e, changes in the entry probability have only very small e¤ects on
the performance measures.
6.4 Multiplicity of Equilibria
Dynamic stochastic games with innite horizons generally have multiple equilibria when players
are patient. Within the context of the Ericson and Pakes model of computable Markov perfect
equilibria, Besanko et al (2010; section 3.1) developed a homotopy based method for tracing
out paths on the equilibrium manifold and systematically nding points in the parameter space
for which multiple equilibria exist.45 It does not, however, provides a guarantee that it will
nd all equilibria.
The homotopy technique depends on di¤erentiating the equations that implicitly dene the
models equilibria. This requirement makes it, as a practical manner, infeasible to apply to
our merger model because a key step in numerically solving for equilibria is a Monte Carlo
integration. Numerically di¤erentiating this integral with reasonable accuracy is not possible
with the computing power to which we have access. Consequently we implemented a cruder
search for multiple equilibria that may fail to nd cases of multiplicity that the homotopy
technique would nd if it were feasible.46
The idea is straightforward. Dene a cube,
D = f(B; c; s)jB 2 [22; 30] & c 2 [2:0; 5:5] & s 2 [1:0; 3:0]g ;
in the parameter space where, as in Section 6.2, s = c   c. Set all other parameters equal to
their baseline values. Along lines within this cube calculate sequences of equilibria using the
equilibrium values of one equilibrium as the starting points for the next equilibrium computa-
tion. For example, for each  2 f0; 0:025; 0:050; : : : ; 0:975; 1g; calculate equilibria along the line
(B; c; s) 2 h22 (1  ) + 30; c; si where c 2 [2:0; 5:5] and s 2 [1:0; 3:0]: Start the equilibrium
calculations from both the  = 0 and the  = 1 ends of the line and use the equilibrium values
calculated for a particular  as the initial values for calculating the equilibrium at the next :
If equilibrium multiplicity exists along the line, then the equilibrium values for a particular 
reached from the lines left end may not equal the equilibrium values for that same  reached
from the lines right end.
WithinD, in order to construct lines of search, we x two of the three parameters (B; c; s) at
values within the three-dimensional array fB 2 [22:0; 23:6; 25:2; 26:8; 28:4; 30:0], c 2 [2:0; 2:7; 3:4; 4:1; 4:8; 5:5],
s 2 [1:0; 1:5; 2:0; 2:5; 3:0]g and then varied the third parameter from its minimum to its max-
imum in 40 steps. This created 36 lines parallel to each axis. For the no-mergers policy we
45See Borkovsky, Doraszelski, and Kryukov (2010, 2012) for further discussion and illustration of how to use
this homotopy technique.
46We thank Ulrich Doraszelski for suggesting this technique to us.
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found multiplicity for some parameter values, but for the all-mergers-allowed policy we found no
multiplicity. Additionally, because calculating Markov perfect policies is much more computer
intensive than calculating xed policy equilibria, we did a less dense search of the parameter
space for Markov perfect policies. We found no multiplicity, but did nd several regions in
which our algorithm failed to calculate an equilibrium.
Each instance of multiplicity that we found for the no-mergers policy has a common struc-
ture. Whenever we found two equilibria for a parameter vector, then the distinguishing strategic
di¤erence was the investment behavior at state (1,0). Total investment is always approximately
the same, but in one equilibrium, the rm with 1 unit of capital invests more, and in the other
equilibrium, the rm with 0 units of capital invests more. Each rm wants to have an aggres-
sive investment policy if the other rm has a passive investment policy, and a passive policy
if the other rm has an aggressive policy. Almost certainly a third equilibrium exists that is
unstable and not computable with our algorithm.47
These instances of multiplicity are all found on lines parallel to the B axis. We found four
regions in the parameter space with multiplicity. Lines where (c; s) are (4:1; 2:2), (4:1; 2:6),
(4:8; 1:0), and (4:8; 1:4) all contain regions of multiplicity. To be specic, consider the line for
which (c; s) = (4:8; 1:4): Multiplicity occurs for B 2 [24:6; 28:0]. Fix B at 26:4 and let the state
be (1; 0). In equilibrium 1rm 1 with one unit of capital builds, in expectation, 2.00 units
of capital while rm 2 with zero units of capital builds, in expectation, 0.61 units of capital. In
equilibrium 2the behavior reverses: rm 1 builds, in expectation, 1.01 units of capital while
rm 2 builds, in expectation, 2.01 units of capital. Table 10 shows performance measures for
these two equilibria.
Finally, we point out that we found no multiplicity at or close to our baseline parameters.
Table 10: Performance Measures for Two Pure Equilibria
under No Mergers at (B;c; s) = (26;4:8;1:4)
Performance measure Equil. 1 Equil. 2
Avg. Consumer Value 22.9 24.9
Avg. Incumbent Value 51.3 51.8
Avg. Aggregate Value 74.2 76.8
Avg. Price 2.42 2.39
Avg. Quantity 15.1 15.8
Avg. Total capital 4.03 4.31
% in monopoly 80.6% 71.2%
% minfK1;K2g  2 14.8% 22.3%
7 Conclusion
We have studied the optimal merger policy in a dynamic industry model in which mergers
o¤er the potential for cost reduction through the achievement of scale economies, but also
increase market power. An antitrust authority must then weigh any potential gain in e¢ ciency
47See Besanko et al. (2012, section 3.2) for a discussion of the inability of Pakes-McGuire-like algorithms to
compute unstable equilibria.
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generated by the merger, over that which would be achieved by internal growth, against the
losses from increased market power.
In terms of the trade-o¤ between internal and external growth we have seen several things.
First, the very nature of this trade-o¤ depends on whether we are taking the perspective
of an antitrust authority that cannot commit and must decide what to do about a given
proposed merger, or the perspective of an authority identifying an optimal commitment policy.
From the former perspective, we have seen that the desirability of approving a merger can
depend importantly on the investment behavior that will follow if it is or is not approved.
However, this involves more than just the behavior of the merging rms, as the investment
behavior of outsiders to the merger (here, new entrants) can have signicant welfare e¤ects.
In the other direction, these investment behaviors can be importantly inuenced by rms
beliefs about future merger policy. From the perspective of identifying an optimal commitment
policy, the potential e¤ects on investment behavior can make the optimal commitment policy
di¤er substantially from the policy that emerges when the antitrust authority instead considers
mergers on a case-by-case basis without commitment. Moreover, in cases in which commitment
is not possible and aggregate value is the true social objective, it is often better in our model
to endow the antitrust authority with a consumer value objective (which roughly corresponds
to the objective of most antitrust authorities).
Whether with or without commitment, however, we have found that in our model the
optimal antitrust policy for maximizing aggregate value is signicantly more restrictive than
the optimal static policy that considers a mergers e¤ects only at the time it would be approved.
In fact, as we have seen, even the comparative statics of the optimal dynamic policy can be
very di¤erent from those of the optimal static policy: for example, an increase in market size
leads to a larger set of states in which mergers increase static aggregate surplus but a smaller
set of states in which an AV-maximizing authority approves a proposed merger. Finally, we
have shown that, contrary to what conventional wisdom may suggest, less timely entry may
induce more mergers to be proposed and approved under the Markov perfect policy (for both
AV and CV criteria).
Our model leaves a number of important research directions open related to this issue.
Most signicant is the need to expand the analysis beyond the case of two active rms. This
will require a model of bargaining with externalities among many parties which is tractable
and o¤ers sensible predictions.
Another direction for future research involves calibrating the model to match key features
of an industry.
At a more general level, the existing literature on antitrust policy has largely neglected
issues relating to investment or rm entry and exit that are inherently dynamic. In a world
where the antitrust authority may not have the ability to commit fully to its future actions,
analyzing such issues requires modeling the authority as a player who acts dynamically. The
present paper is a rst step in doing so in a truly dynamic setting. By proposing a merger-
neutral investment technology that allows for complex multi-unit investment choices, and yet
is tractable, it also contributes to the computational industrial organization literature more
generally.
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8 Appendix: Entrant Identity
A key restriction in our model is that no more than two rms can be active at any one time.
Throughout this restriction has been posed exogenously. Our baseline assumption is that the
entering rm after a merger is owned by an entrepreneur who has never before been active
within the industry. This assumption begs the question as to why he did not enter previously
before the merger took place. A more satisfactory model would allow free entry with entry
stopping only when the value of the potential entrant becomes negative. Implementing this
creates two di¢ culties. With three or more active rms a merger between two of them may
have positive externalities on one or more of the non-merging rms. A satisfactory model of
bargaining with positive externalities and three or more principals has not yet been developed
to our knowledge. Moreover, if one were developed, equilibrium behavior would almost cer-
tainly involve delay. That would create the additional di¢ culty of a second time scale within
our model. Currently with a discount factor of  = 0:8 periods are on the order of ve years.
This is reasonable for a capital intensive industry that for both physical and regulatory rea-
sons has a very long capital planning and construction cycle. This, however, is a completely
unreasonable period length for a merger negotiation between two ambitious CEOs and their
boards. Incorporating this second time scale into our model will necessitate some modeling
and computational innovations.
An alternative to the exogenous restriction we have used is to assume that only two en-
trepreneurs have the necessary skill and knowledge set to compete in the industry. If that is
the case and both entrepreneurs are active in the industry, then the owner/manager of the
acquired rm would become the new entrant following a merger. (We assume there is not a
no-compete clause in the acquisition agreement.) Equation (1) giving the joint value gain
from merging then becomes
G (K1;K2) 

V (K1 +K2; 0) + V (0;K1 +K2)
  V (K1;K2) + V (K2;K1)	 :
New to the denition is the entrants ex ante value V (0;K1 +K2). It must be included because
the entrepreneur who is bought out intends to re-enter. In other words, the two entrepreneurs
will agree to merge one buying out the other if it pays them jointly to create temporarily
a monopoly situation in the industry until that time the bought-out entrepreneur successfully
returns to the industry. Since V (0;K1 +K2)  0 this weakly increases the merger frequency
(holding the policy and value function constant). Figure 31 shows a side-by-side comparison for
the intermediate market of the equilibria for these two di¤erent assumptions concerning entry.
When all mergers are allowed, this change increases the frequency of mergers. (Although note
that in the AV-maximizing Markov perfect policy the merger frequency ends up lower than
before.) Inspection shows that, overall, our results are not qualitatively di¤erent from our
earlier results.
9 Appendix: Computational Algorithm
In this section, we describe the algorithm used to compute equilbrium in our model. The algo-
rithm uses value function iteration and is similar to the Pakes and McGuire (1994) algorithm.
55
Figure 31: Equilibrium in the intermediate market under two entry assumptions. The left
column shows equilibria in which entry is by an entrepreneur who is new to the industry. The
right column shows equilibria in which entry is by the entrepreneur who until earlier in the
period was active in the industry and agreed to be bought out.
This section proceeds as follows. First, we list the algorithms input parameters. Then, we
explain the initial computations prior to value function iteration. Next, we explain the value
function iteration itself and, nally, we dene convergence of the algorithm.
9.1 Parameters
The algorithm makes use of the following parameters:
1. Demand and Production:
 Parameters (B;A) from the demand function Q = B  (A  p).
 Parameters (; ; w) from the production function Q = KL(1 ) with wage pa-
rameter w.
 Throughout the computations, we set (A; ; ; w) = (3; 23 ; 1:1; 1) and B 2 [22; 26; 30].
2. Investment:
 Parameters (c; c), corresponding to the minimum and maximum values of capital
augmentation cost draws. Augmentation costs are uniformly distributed in this
interval.
 Parameters (cg; cg), correspond to the minimum and maximum values of the green-
eld cost draws. Greeneld costs are uniformly distributed in this interval.
 Throughout the computations, we set cg = c, implying that the minimum greeneld
cost draw is the same as the maximum augmentation cost draw.
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3. Merger:
 Parameters (; ) and (b; b) form the intervals of merger proposal and blocking costs,
respectively. Both types of costs are uniformly distributed.
 a is a matrix dening in which states mergers are allowed.
 fixedMP is a binary variable indicating whether the authoritys policy is a com-
mitment policy (fixedMP = 1) or not.
 boughtIsEntrant is a binary variable indicating whether the acquired rm becomes
the entrant (boughtIsEntrant = 1) or if there is a new entrant.
 cvCriterion is a binary variable indicating whether the merger authority uses a
consumer value (CV) (cvCriterion = 1) or aggregate value (AV) criterion.
4. Other:
 S = f0; 1; :::; Sg is the set of possible capital levels Ki for each rm i.
  is the discount factor.
 d is the depreciation factor.
 Throughout the computations, we set (S; ; d) = (20; 0:8; 0:2).
9.2 Initial Calculations
Using the demand and production parameters, we start by calculating Cournot equilibrium
quantities and prots for each interim state (K1;K2). We dene  as an (S + 1)  (S + 1)
matrix where an element of the matrix gives the prot of the row rm when the rival is the
column rm. We then calculate the depreciation function , given by equation (4) in Section
3 and dening the transition probability from one capital level to another due to depreciation.
Next, we initialize variables used in the value function iteration. V is an (S + 1) (S + 1)
matrix where an element of the matrix gives the beginning-of-period value of the row rm. V
is dened analogously for interim values.  is a rms investment policy function. Ec is the
expected investment cost function given interim capital levels and an investment policy . a
is an (S + 1) (S + 1) matrix where each element gives the probability that a merger in that
state will be approved by the antitrust authority, and  is an (S + 1) (S + 1) matrix where
each element gives the probability that a merger is proposed.
To start the iteration process we require initial values for all of these functions and matrices.
V and V are set equal to =(1   ), the value that would result in each state if rms were
not allowed to invest and capital did not depreciate.  is set to the identity transition, i.e.,
(kij; ) = 1 if ki = 0, and (kij; ) = 0 otherwise. Ec is set equal to 0 and a is set to the
inputted a matrix.48
We also keep old matrices and functions from the previous iteration while we update in the
current iteration. V 0 is the previous iterations value for the matrix V . V
0
, 0, Ec0, a0, and  0
are dened analogously.
48Experimenting with di¤erent starting values, the algorithm yielded the same equilibrium values.
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9.3 Value Function Iteration
The value function iteration contains seven main steps. First, all of the old matrices and
functions are set to the values calculated in the previous iteration. For example, V 0 is rst set
equal to V , and then a new V is calculated in the current iteration. Next, we calculate a new
 and Ec based on the input parameters V 0 and 0. This is the most computationally intensive
part of the iteration.
The investment transition probabilities and costs contained in  and Ec are computed using
Monte Carlo integration to integrate equation (6) in Section 3, which gives , and equation
(7), which gives Ec. The Monte Carlo integration involves simulating thousands of vectors of
investment cost draws using the investment parameters and, for each vector, identifying the
optimal investment level based on the cost draws and on V 0, 0, and . By averaging over the
large number of vectors of cost draws, we arrive at new values of  and Ec. The calculations
are done for each pair (Ki;K i) of capital levels.
The row rm gets Ki capital augmentation cost draws and one greeneld cost draw. (Recall
that each capital augmentation draw can be used at most once, whereas a rm may build as
many units of capital as it wants at the greeneld cost draw). When building new capital
rms use the lowest cost draws su¢ cient to reach the desired capital level. Given the vector
~c of capital augmentation and greeneld cost draws, the investment cost function is given by
cKi(j~c). The benets of investing are determined by the induced change in the rms expected
discounted ex ante value next period. Trading o¤ the costs and benets, rm i solves the
following optimization problem:
max
ki2f0;1;:::;S Kig
 cKi(kij~c) + 
X
K0i2S
X
K0 i2S
(K 0ijKi + ki) 0(K 0 ijK i;Ki;  i)V 0(K 0i;K 0 i);
where  0 is the rival rms combined investment and depreciation transition probability dened
in Section 3. The solution to this problem is denoted ki . Using this solution, we derive an
updated investment policy  and expected average investment cost Ec, where the average is
taken over all vectors of cost draws.
To facilitate convergence of the algorithm, we dampen  and Ec with 0 and Ec0. The amount
of weight put on the old values of 0 and Ec0 is gradually increased from 0 to a maximum of
.95 as the number of iterations increases.  and Ec are the only variables which are dampened,
but the dampening propagates to the other variables which are calculated using  and Ec.
The third step in the value function iteration involves updating the interim value V using
equation (8) in Section 3, based on the updated functions  and Ec along with V 0. V is used
in the next two steps to update the matrices  and a.
 is calculated using V , a0, and the merger proposal cost interval [; ], according to
equation (2) in Section 3:
 (K1;K2)  (a0(K1;K2)G(K1;K2))
where G is the gain from merger calculated using V .
In the case of a no-commitment merger policy, a is recomputed according to equation (13)
in Section 3.
The sixth step of the value function iteration involves computing a new beginning-of-period
value V , according to equation (3) in Section 3.
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The nal step involves comparing V and V 0 to check convergence. If V and V 0 are su¢ -
ciently close, the algorithm stops; otherwise, the algorithm continues with the next iteration.
9.4 Convergence
Our distance measure between V and V 0 is a modied Maximum metric, dened as the mini-
mum of the standard Maximum metric and a maximum percentage change metric:
D(V; V 0) = min

max
K1;K2
jV (K1;K2)  V 0(K1;K2)j; max
K1;K2
jV (K1;K2)  V 0(K1;K2)j
jV 0(K1;K2)j

We use this minimum to avoid two problems with each of the two individual metrics. While
the Maximum metric treats a value of 1000 as being just as close to 1000.1 as a value of 1 is to
1.1, when dening convergence we would like to consider 1000 and 1000.1 to be the same but
1 and 1.1 to be di¤erent. The maximum percentage change metric does not su¤er from this
issue. But there is a problem with the maximum percentage change metric when considering
convergence to 0. Suppose that, after each iteration, the value of a variable is moving halfway
to 0, in which case the variable gets arbitrarily close to 0 as the number of iterations becomes
large but the percentage change will stay at 50%. In light of these issues, we use the minimum
of the two metrics. For most of our computations, the algorithm stops when the distance
measure is less than 0.0005.
As the iteration process proceeds we also increase the dampening ratio and increase the
number of draws that are used. The dampening ratio gradually increases from 0 to 0.95 and
the number of draws from 3,000 to 192,000. Convergence is frequently achieved before we reach
the maximum number of draws and the maximum dampening ratio.
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